

WHAT GERMANY WANTS



EDMUND VON MACH



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

WHAT GERMANY WANTS



Emperor William II at his desk in his villa on the
Island of Corfu.

HG
M149w

WHAT GERMANY WANTS

BY
EDMUND VON MACH



BOSTON
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY

1914

135678
25/11/15

Copyright, 1914,
BY LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY.

All rights reserved

Published, October, 1914
Reprinted, October, 1914 (twice)
November, 1914
December, 1914

Printers
S. J. PARKHILL & CO., BOSTON, U.S.A.

A PERSONAL FOREWORD

DURING the preparation of this book the writer received from his uncle, a veteran army officer living in Dresden, a brief note containing the following laconic record:

1793, your great grandfather at Kostheim.

1815, your grandfather at Liegnitz.

1870, myself — all severely wounded by French bullets.

1914, my son, captain in the 6th Regiment of Dragoons.

Four generations obliged to fight the French!

When the writer turns to his American friends of French descent, he finds there similar records, and often even greater sorrow, for death has come to many of them. In Europe their families and his have looked upon each other as enemies for generations, while a few years in the clarifying atmosphere of America have made friends of former Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, and Englishmen.

Jointly they pray that the present war may not be carried to such a pass that an early and honorable peace becomes impossible for any one of

these great nations. Is it asking too much that America may be vouchsafed in not too distant a future to do for their respective native lands what the American institutions have done for them individually, help them to regard each other at their true worth, unblinded by traditional hatred or fiery passion?

In the tense moments of personal or international intercourse, blessed are the contestants who have a wise and a steadfast friend, one who, knowing both sides, can reconcile their fundamental differences. Since war is generally only the culmination of many previous grievances and misunderstandings, the friend who will give more time to a study of the true aims of the contestants than to their claims and counter-claims in their moments of heated passion, is likely to be most serviceable.

This is the purpose of the present book, to show that Germany too had "hitched her wagon to a star." If there had been the least danger of doing more than this, namely of unloading on any one of the other nations the bitterness which many Americans have felt towards Germany, the book would not have been written, for America can be the helpful friend only if bitterness gives way to sympathy.

May there come out of this terrific struggle ways and means of preventing similar tragedies

A PERSONAL FOREWORD vii

in the future, not by laws and regulations, but by a better understanding and a higher morality of the peoples of the world. And may America, who has adopted the sons of so many nations, lead the way and gain the gratitude of mankind!

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
A PERSONAL FOREWORD	v
I. WHAT GERMANY WANTS	i
II. ALSACE - LORRAINE	17
III. THE GERMAN EMPEROR	24
IV. THE PAST	40
V. THE NEW EMPIRE	49
VI. RUSSIA, THE SLAVS, AND GERMANY	60
VII. GERMANY AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE	80
VIII. GERMANY AND ENGLAND	99
IX. MILITARISM	123
X. CONCLUSION	137
APPENDIX A. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG, AUGUST 5, 1914	146
APPENDIX B. QUOTATIONS FROM THE BRITISH "BERNHARDI"	154

What Germany Wants

CHAPTER I

WHAT GERMANY WANTS

IN moments of great stress, when horror at terrible agonies strikes deep into the souls of men, their overwrought nerves need an outlet somewhere. Those friends of Germany who see in the spontaneous outburst against that land only hatred, ignorance, and prejudice, do not know America. If Americans could not give vent to their pent-up emotions by joining in the headliner's righteous indignation at the less harrowing concomitants of war, such as the burning of a city, but were obliged to think of war itself, of the "poor devils" dying in the ditches, of the machine guns wiping out with a few turns of the crank the youths of an entire village; if they were forced to think of the wounded over whose maimed bodies the battles are raging, or of those who are forgotten and alone, they would not be Americans, warm-hearted and quick of sympathy, if they could stand it.

Underneath all this seeming bluster and seeming bitterness the real American, even he of German descent, detects the desire of all classes to be fair to the contestants. This appeared very clearly in the advice of prominent men publicly offered in the early days of the war, to the effect that America should distinguish between the Kaiser and the German people. Later it was found that no such distinction could be made because the agreement between the German people and the Emperor had never been closer than it was in the early days of August, 1914, and is today.

Many friends of Germany, in their eagerness to plead her cause, have added to the general confusion by attacking the sincerity of her opponents. As if a course could be made righteous by the mere fact that there was unrighteousness also on the other side. This argument is useless in America, where people are convinced that Heaven does not always employ angels only to carry out its purposes.

Paul Rohrbach, a well-known German publicist, has stated the case very well, when he said to his countrymen two years ago: "We need not disguise the fact from ourselves that in many parts of the world we are less liked than, for instance, the English or the French. People will say how can this be possible, since both England and France have often been guilty of violence

and insolence in their dealings with weaker nations? This is true, but the more important fact is also true, that powerful cultural influences have emanated from both countries, and have been gratefully felt in the whole world. Many people therefore possess a vivid picture of what the English and the French people have done for the culture of the world while few have any similar feeling toward Germany. Individual citizens of foreign states who have made our acquaintance or whose education enables them to appreciate even without such an acquaintance the German contributions to the general culture of the world, will no doubt do justice to our achievements, but nations as such are little acquainted with each other, and are hardly able to judge one another objectively and fairly. It is therefore not at all astonishing that the younger people of the western hemisphere, whose states have recently been formed, and the older states of Asia, who are gradually leaving their seclusion of thousands of years, should know little more of us than our most recent accomplishments since the foundations of the German Empire. Our former achievements, such as the liberation of the human mind in the age of the Reformation, the part we played in the literature of the world from the middle of the eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century, and the foundation of the

philosophy of ideas, these are all matters which people of average cultivation do not understand. What people do know is this — forty years ago the Germans suddenly rose from an existence which was insignificant both economically and politically to one of great strength; they fought for and won the rank of a world power, and have since created a mighty army; they have tremendously increased their commerce and their industries, and have built ships; and they have now also begun to demand consideration for their interests in the world at large.”

Friends of Germany should be grateful for every American who knows Germany better than Rohrbach here implies — and there are many — and should endeavor to supply all the others with information from which to form a correct picture of the fatherland.

England is pretty well understood here; not a saint by any means forgetful of her own interests, but on the whole drawing nearer all the time to the moral perfection which her leaders proclaim, and advancing the civilization of the world in a way that America can understand.

France, once the mistress of the world and still holding a preëminent place, is dear to Americans because of the charm of her language, her art, her good taste, the courtesy of

her people, her form of government, and the help she gave America in her War of Independence.

Russia is very little known, although her literature, her art, and her music are constant topics of study and conversation. As a country she is felt to be a power with which the world has to reckon. She is, she was, and she will be.

Whoever, therefore, is to blame for the actual outbreak of this war, the belief is widely held that Germany and her aspirations were directly or indirectly responsible for it. It can be freely admitted that there are aspects of the situation under which such an interpretation is possible, and it is therefore at this point that the question arises, What does Germany want?

This is the really important question and one which it should not be impossible to answer. It differs therefore from others which it would seem futile to propose at present for only the future will be able to decide whether Germany, or Russia, or perhaps Great Britain, could have avoided the war; whether the Allies or the Germans are responsible for the atrocities mentioned in the papers, or whether, perhaps, both should be acquitted from the charges of unnecessary brutality. To a certain extent the facts are not yet available, and to a certain extent the perfectly natural bias of the several editors —

they would not be human if they could refrain from taking sides — presents the facts in such a way that the careful reader must refuse to form his opinion only on what he reads. On September 28, for instance, one paper contained this item under the caption “A Detestable Form of Warfare”: “Can anyone doubt what would have been the answer of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, or Grant, had it been proposed to them to drop bombs into the throng of Sunday promenaders of a city not besieged or invested? . . . These great generals bombarded cities whose inmates had to take the chances of war. But there is a distinction between bombardment and bomb dropping under such conditions as governed the practice in Paris yesterday.” Another daily referred to exactly the same incident as follows: “The dramatic event of yesterday was the attack on the Eiffel Tower by a German aircraft which suddenly appeared high above Paris and made four unsuccessful attempts from a great height to wreck this well-known landmark. It would have been a pretty *coup* had it succeeded, as it would have cut off wireless communication between France and Russia, a thing which the Germans no doubt are very desirous of accomplishing. The casualties resulting from this unsuccessful attack were small. The accounts differ as to whether there

were any fatalities or not. In some a man and a child were killed, in others only injured."

Which account should a man in search of the truth believe? Did the Germans wish to destroy the Eiffel Tower with its powerful wireless station and was the resulting injury to the civilian bystanders one of the unavoidable chances of war? Or did the Germans, in fiendish brutality, drop bombs on a throng of Sunday promenaders, using the Eiffel Tower as a pretext? Unless the reader has a previous knowledge of the character of the German people which makes the one or the other account probable, he is at a loss, since the proof of the accuracy of either report is obviously impossible at present.

The character of the German people, however, will be fairly well established when their aspirations are known and an answer is given to the question, What does Germany want?

Some people may feel that a satisfactory answer has been supplied by such books as *Germany and the Next War*, by General von Bernhardi, and *Pan-Germanism* by Professor Roland G. Usher. Since the German, Bernhardi, and the American, Usher, are said to be in substantial agreement, and the present war, in general, seems to follow Bernhardi's prophecies, it is natural that these two writers should seem to be correct.

The conclusions which the reading public has drawn from them are briefly these: Germany, drunk with her material successes of the recent past and trusting in the strength of her huge army, has formed the plan of conquering the world. She has nailed to her mast Madame de Staël's motto "The patriotism of nations ought to be selfish", and recognizes no other law than that of brute force. The present war marks a step in her well-planned scheme. If successful, she will annex Belgium and Holland, humiliate France, try to despoil Great Britain of her navy and her colonies, push Russia back towards Asia, and establish, together with Austria, a huge Balkan empire which will open for her a way to Egypt and India. Just what will become of Italy and Spain is not quite clear for, without resting on her laurels, Germany will turn her eyes unto the western hemisphere and make war on the United States of America.

Although few readers believe that Germany will succeed in the first step of this career they see nothing improbable in Professor Usher's presentation, for, whom the gods would destroy they first make mad, and Germany is riding for a fall.

Those who know Germany do not agree with Professor Usher, but then — that is their opinion against his. Unfortunately for his argument Mr. Usher has added to his book a bibliography

which at least casts doubts on the impartiality of his judgment for it shows that he consulted many British journals, the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th Edition, six British books, three French books, and not a single German book, while he says of a volume of essays by British and German statesmen "They do not afford much information." He thus leaves us in doubt as to the sources and contexts of those German writings on which he has obviously drawn in support of his own theory. They would seem to be taken largely from the writings of a so-called Pan-Germanic league which Mr. Usher himself considers of insufficient importance to deserve mention in his bibliography.

Nobody can deny that there may be persons in Germany holding the views attributed to the German nation by Mr. Usher, and that some British publicists have frightened their countrymen into regarding the Germans as dangerous madmen.

It is more difficult to prove that General von Bernhardi also does not adequately represent the Germans. Since the war began he and his writings have jumped into public notice, and in a much quoted interview (September 27, 1914) President David Starr Jordan, of Leland Stanford University, relates that he heard Bernhardi lecture in San Francisco on May 25, 1913:

“He had been on a tour round the world, stopping at places where there were Germans, and giving lectures under the official support of the consuls of the Empire, and with the respective consuls presiding in the chair.”

At that time the author was the president of the *Bostoner Deutsche Gesellschaft*, a society of about six hundred members, Americans, Germans, and Frenchmen, interested in all phases of German culture. He was constantly on the lookout for speakers of prominence and was in close touch with the Germanistic Society of America. The German consul in Boston was a member of the governing board of the *Gesellschaft* and so were several professors of the neighborhood whose intimate relations with the German Government are well-known. The German Ambassador was an honorary member of the *Gesellschaft*. Bernhardi's name was not brought to the attention of the lecture committee through any one of these channels, which proves that his writings meant little or nothing to the Germans of New England. Their number may be comparatively small but since most of them have home ties in Germany it would seem that also there Bernhardi was not the man of the hour he is believed to have been.

As a matter of fact, Bernhardi's book did not voice the popular sentiment of Germany, for

Bernhardi himself said in his introduction: "In striking contrast to this military aptitude [of the Germans] they have today become a peace-loving — an almost too peace-loving nation. A rude shock is needed to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show their military strength." These words were written in October, 1911, and no rude shock came to awaken the German nation from pursuing its ways of peace until August, 1914.

The reason why Bernhardi's book, *Germany and the Next War*, did not make a greater stir was that such books¹ are by no means rare in Europe. Written by military men, they are often altogether technical, as for instance General von Bernhardi's other great book *War Today*, and when they touch upon social and political matters they are often so extreme that people do not acknowledge them as true.

In the same year 1911 a French officer, Colonel Arthur Boucher, published a book entitled *La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain* (France Victorious in the Next War); and even more remarkable was *La Guerre de Demain* (The Next War) by M. Keller, published September 10, 1891, in which not only the invasion

¹ For a very similar book presenting the British view see *The Day of the Saxon*, by Homer Lea, in which Great Britain is urged first to attack and to destroy Germany, and then to attack Russia. For extracts from this book see Appendix B.

but also the final annexation of Belgium by France was outlined. These designs on the neutrality of Belgium induced Charles Woeste, ex-Minister of Justice, to write his eloquent book *La Neutralité Belge* (Brussels, 1891).

While the two French books mentioned and their discussions of tactical problems may have been carefully studied by the French General Staff nobody would be rash enough to claim that they were representative of the aspirations of the French people. The same is true of Bernhardi's book published under a similar title. In so far as his advice is strategically good it will probably be followed by the German army; but it will, on reflection, hardly be doubted that Bernhardi neither spoke for the Germans as such, nor that his book had any influence on the people as a whole.

If, then, Pan-Germanism is not what Germany wants what was the purpose of her huge armaments which brought her to the brink of bankruptcy, as has been claimed, and made an "armed camp" of her country?

Strangely enough neither of these assertions, both of which have been readily believed outside of Germany, is true. On June 16, 1914, Mr. Edgar Crammond read a paper¹ before the

¹ Printed in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, July, 1914.

Royal Statistical Society in London on *The Economic Relations of the British and German Empires*, and stated that "the debt of the Imperial German Government and the German Federal Governments amounted to 1,028,600,000 pounds, or £15.16.8 per head of the population, while the debt of the United Kingdom amounted to 747,750,000 pounds, or £16.10.0 per head of the population." In the ensuing discussion, in which Lord Welby, Sir George Paish and others took part, it was brought out by Mr. J. Ellis Barker that "In Germany there was on balance *no* national debt, because the assets of the State were considerably greater than all the State and National Debts combined." These assets consist of the State railways, forests, mines, salt works, and so forth. While therefore the National Debt of the United Kingdom amounts to £16.10.0 (about \$80.00) per head of the population, there is in Germany a balance on the credit side, the assets being larger than the liabilities. No figures of the actual size of this balance are available. A country, however, which makes such a favorable showing on the figures presented by its greatest rival can by no stretch of the imagination be called bankrupt, and with this, one of the causes of the war frequently mentioned by the "man on the street" is seen to be fictitious. Germany did not go to war because "she had

14 WHAT GERMANY WANTS

spent on her armaments as much as her credit would stand", nor because "she would have to disarm unless she could retrieve her fortunes by an enormous indemnity to be paid to her after a successful war."

As regards the statement that Germany had made an armed camp of the country, and that this state of affairs had become unbearable, it should be noted that the regular term of service of her soldiers was two years and of all young men of some education only one year, while more young men of the proper age presented themselves annually than could be used in the army. At the outbreak of the present war more than one million men, many of them not previously trained in the army, volunteered their services, and early in September the Government was obliged to announce that for the present no more men could be enlisted.

Compare this with the conditions in other European countries, where, in some instances, all able-bodied young men had to serve in the army not only one or two but three years. Remember, also, the tens of thousands of German reservists on furlough in every part of the globe, and unable to return home at this time, and you will readily see that the picture of Germany as an armed camp is overdrawn. Germans, moreover, do not look upon the one or two years they spend

in the army as so much time wasted but as an invaluable training. They would agree with Dr. Levi M. Powers, who wrote in the *Gloucester Times*, September 12, 1914: "The German boy at sixteen or seventeen is a spindled-shanked prig. By the time the army is through with him he is physically the best developed man of Europe, democratised by contact with all classes. Because of her army Germany is a nation physically disciplined, and taught as no other people the value and meaning of law and order."

This brings us to the point, so often overlooked outside of Germany, that the German army is a Citizen Army existing for the defence of the fatherland. When its constituent units are not in commission they are in commerce throughout the world basing their commercial actions on peaceful international relations, which are best expressed by the lengthy terms of their business contracts with citizens of other nations.

Since Germany started on her industrial development she has never desired war. Her aggressiveness has been solely commercial, and commercial aggressiveness and military aggressiveness are mutually destructive.

Germany wants to keep the confines of her home-land inviolate but is not desirous of joining to them new lands of unwilling people.

She wants to develop her colonies and invest

her money in the building of extra-territorial railways which will ultimately bring her into relation with new markets.

She wants to develop her home commerce and industry, and increase the usefulness of her agriculture that she may give employment to a population growing at the rate of about a million a year. There has been no balance of emigration from Germany for many years.

Over and above these desires she has the very natural and proper ambition to be worthy of her great past and to make her own contributions to the civilization of the world. She wants social justice, and she wishes to remove from her laboring classes the ills of poverty.

Germany wants peace, for in peace only can she do what she has set out to do. She wants an honorable and a stable peace, and in so far as the defects of her character have been contributory causes to misunderstandings she wishes to eradicate these defects. She desires the goodwill of the world.

CHAPTER II

ALSACE - LORRAINE

CONTRARY to the general belief Bismarck is said to have regretted more than anyone the necessity of taking Alsace-Lorraine from France in 1871. It is true that these provinces had belonged to Germany from the time of the division of Charlemagne's empire in 843 to 1648, when Germany, exhausted by the Thirty Years' War and torn by internal dissensions, was forced to cede the greater part of them to France; Strassburg and the surrounding territory was seized by Louis XIV in time of peace in 1681. The people of Alsace are almost entirely of German stock, belonging to the Alemannian tribe, from the name of which the French name for Germany, *Allemagne*, is derived. That their native speech is German will appear even to the uninitiated from such names as Mülhausen, Breisach, Strassburg, Weissenburg, Saarburg, etc. Similarly, the population of Lorraine is for the most part closely related to that of the adjoining part of Prussia.¹

¹ H. C. G. von Jagemann, *The Outlook*, September 16, 1914.

In spite of this Bismarck foresaw that France would not rest while she could hope some day to regain these provinces. The very peace, therefore, which concluded the Franco-Prussian war laid the foundation of another war in the future. This was a heavy price to pay, but without Alsace and Lorraine the South German States felt unable to join the federation of the German Empire. Bismarck therefore yielded and gave his reasons in a speech delivered May 2, 1871. He pointed out that there had not been "a generation of our fathers for three hundred years which had not been forced to draw the sword against France", and that after the successful war of 1870 it had become our duty to take steps against similar attacks. The first step was the federation of the German States in the German Empire, which, owing to the then existing geographical and strategic frontier, was impossible of fulfillment without the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck says, "I cannot describe our condition, and especially that of South Germany, better than with the words of a thoughtful South German sovereign, the late King William of Würtemberg, who said to me, 'The crux of the situation is Strassburg; for as long as Strassburg is not German, South Germany will be unable to give herself unreservedly to German unity and a national German

policy. As long as Strassburg is a sally-port for an ever-ready army of one hundred thousand or one hundred and fifty thousand men, Germany finds herself unable to appear on the upper Rhine with an equally numerous army on time. The French will always be here first.' I believe this instance taken from an actual occurrence says everything. I need not add one word."

Bismarck then discusses the suggestion, which had been offered, of making a neutral State of these provinces, similar to those of Belgium and Switzerland, so that there would have been a chain of neutral states from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps. He points out the impracticability of this plan for several reasons but especially because "neutrality can only be maintained when the inhabitants are determined to preserve an independent and neutral position. This supposition would not be true in the immediate future for the neutrality of Alsace and Lorraine. On the contrary, it is to be expected that the strong French elements which will survive in the country for a long while will induce the people to unite with France in the case of another Franco-German war. The neutrality of Alsace-Lorraine, therefore, would have been merely a sham working harm for us and benefits for France. Nothing was left, therefore, but to bring both these countries with their strong

fortresses completely under German control. It was our purpose to establish them as a powerful bulwark in Germany's defence against France, and to move the starting-point of a possible French attack several days marches farther back."

Germany heartily concurred in Bismarck's conclusion and has ever since believed that her possession of these two provinces is necessary for her safety. For France, however, their loss was of great sentimental moment. The statue of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde in Paris has been draped in mourning forty-three years, and France has made no secret of her intense desire to regain possession of these provinces. It is idle to deny that all advances to a better understanding between Germany and France have failed on that account, and this in spite of the sincere friendship which has drawn individual Frenchmen and Germans together, especially when they have met in foreign lands. Germany could not be safe without Alsace-Lorraine, and France would not be happy while she mourned their loss.

This feeling in France, moreover, has been artificially fanned by a small part of the Alsatian press and most of the French press, who have tried to make the world believe that the inhabitants of these provinces wished to return

to French rule. How ill-founded this appeal to French chivalry was appears from the letter written to the presiding officer of the Reichstag under date of August 5, 1914, by the Alsatian representative in the German Reichstag, Dr. Ricklin. Dr. Ricklin is also the speaker of the second chamber of the Alsatian legislature. The letter, translated, reads:

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Please excuse my absence from the Reichstag. I started for Berlin Sunday night, August 2, but was taken ill suddenly and had to return to Carspach-Sonnenberg. I regret my absence from the Reichstag very much because I should have liked to take the opportunity of expressing there in the name of my constituents my regret and deep sorrow at the political difficulties which have arisen. The idea of war between Germany and France is so terrible and awful for us people in Alsace-Lorraine that we hardly dare to think of it. We do not want a war between Germany and France at any cost, certainly not for the sake of altering our political position. People who have spread a different view among the French and have thereby fanned the French thoughts of war, are traitors to our people and have drawn upon themselves the curses of thousands of Alsace-Lorraine people, fathers, mothers, and wives, who with bleeding hearts must see their sons and husbands go into the most terrible of all wars.

To the last we hoped that we might be spared

the terrors of a war between Germany and France, and even now our people refuse to give up hope. If, however, God has decreed differently, well—then the Alsace-Lorraine people too will do their whole duty and they will do it without a single reservation.

The rules of the Reichstag do not permit a representative to vote by mail, but I have the right to inform you, Mr. Speaker, that I should have voted, if I had been present, in favor of all the bills which the present state of affairs demanded, including the bill granting the necessary funds for carrying on the war.

You have the right, Mr. Speaker, to make any use you choose of this letter. With the expression of great respect I am very sincerely yours, (signed) DR RICKLIN, member of the Reichstag.

This letter proves the accuracy of Bismarck's prophecy that in time and by patience the hostility of the people of Alsace-Lorraine would be overcome. "For we have," he said, "many means at our disposal. We Germans are accustomed to govern more benevolently, sometimes more awkwardly, but in the long run really more benevolently and humanely than the French statesmen. We are, moreover, able to grant the inhabitants a far greater degree of communal and individual freedom than the French institutions and traditions ever permitted." This has been done and the loyalty of these prov-

inces in the present crisis is undoubtedly due to the amount of communal and individual freedom which they have enjoyed under German rule, and which is far in excess of the amount of liberty granted Ireland under the recent Home Rule Bill, or enjoyed by any French province or municipality.

Added, therefore, to her firm belief that Alsace and Lorraine are necessary for her safety, Germany has felt the need of defending her latest countrymen in the possession of their individual and communal freedom, possible for them only under German rule.

Germany knew that France had not abated her desire to possess herself of these provinces, for like an honorable opponent France had never disguised her expectations in this matter. When France, therefore, mobilized her troops after war had been declared between Germany and Russia — to which latter country she was bound by a defensive, and possibly an offensive alliance — war between France and Germany became a certainty, especially when France declared that she could give no assurances of peace, but would do what her interests demanded.

CHAPTER III

THE GERMAN EMPEROR

THE German Empire is a federation of German States, three of which have a republican form of government. The Emperor is the president and chief executive of the federation, but his decrees require for their validity the counter signature of a responsible minister. In time of peace the larger States, such as Bavaria, are practically independent even in their military affairs. In war, however, the Emperor is the commander-in-chief of all the troops of the empire, or to quote the customary expression, the chief "Kriegsherr." This is literally translated "War-lord", and in German implies that he is the chief lord only in war, while in peace he shares this honor with the executives of other States.

The legislature of the empire consists of two houses, the Bundesrat, or Council of the Federation, the members of which are appointed by the several States, and the Reichstag, which is elected by universal suffrage. A declaration of war needs the consent of the Bundesrat, "unless an

attack on the territory or the coast of the Federation has taken place", while the appropriations for carrying on the war must be voted by the Reichstag.

As regards the present war, the votes of Parliament were unanimous, even the social democrats, the Poles, Danes, and representatives from Alsace-Lorraine voting for the necessary funds.

It will thus be seen that the powers of the Emperor are circumscribed, and that his influence depends more on the strength of his personality than on the prerogatives of his office — which, by the way, carries no salary. He receives a salary as King of Prussia from that State.

If the present Emperor, nevertheless, has been the most influential man in Germany in recent years, this has been due to the fact that he has completely identified himself with the aspirations of Germany. What she wanted, he wanted — peace and progress. Did he at first lead the people, or did they urge him on? It would be difficult to say. The fact is that the people early believed in Emperor William's wise leadership and that this belief soon grew to be a conviction. In the beginning there was much criticism, but this gave way to liking, liking to admiration, and admiration to sincere love.

Although handicapped from infancy by a crip-

pled left arm, William II has become an all-round athlete, being an especially fine horseman and sailor, a good tennis player, and a crack huntsman. The only reminder one has of his deformity is found in the kind of photographs of him offered for sale. When the Emperor is taken in uniform with his left arm resting on the hilt of his sword, the shadows can be so managed that the deformity of this arm is hardly seen.

This accounts for the many military pictures of the Emperor, and is a pity, because it is apt to make one forget that William II has been after all the great prince of peace, and the patron of the peaceful pursuits of the Germans. There is no branch of art, including music and literature, no industry, no part of agriculture or commerce, no detailed plan of education, no suggestion for the betterment of existing social conditions, which he has not fostered or called into life.

It is well known that William II has a high idea of the so-called divine right theory. This, as many assume, is "the patient's belief in his own sanctity", or, to quote again, "there is a halo about his head." An American straw hat, however, of the kind the Emperor is wearing in the picture printed as the frontispiece of this book, is a poor hiding place for a divine right

halo. If more pictures of the Corfu kind, and not so many of the military kind, had become known, less extravagant stories of the "war lord" and his wrongly interpreted divine right theories would have received currency.

The Germans have never believed these stories for they were contradicted by the man whom they saw working for their happiness and the progress and safety of their country.

The Emperor is a deeply religious man, and his "divine rights" theory means after all nothing but what many people believe, namely that God has placed each man in his own special sphere, and has commanded him to do his best. It is the great gospel of personal responsibility.

Nothing probably can give one a better understanding of this side of the Emperor's character than his own speeches.¹ On October 17, 1903, when Prince August Wilhelm and Prince Oskar, his fourth and fifth sons, joined the church, the Emperor addressed to them this advice at a dinner in his private residence in Potsdam:

My dear Sons: In this moment when we are ready to call for a toast in your honor, and to offer you our congratulations at having joined the company of grown-ups in active service;

¹ A larger collection of the Emperor's speeches in translation is found in *The German Classics*, Vol. XIV, published by the German Publication Society, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York.

when you are eager for work in the Kingdom of God, I as your father wish to give you some advice on your way.

This day is for you, in a spiritual sense, what swearing to the colors is to the officers and privates of the army. Today you have become of age spiritually, if I may say so, and the weapons and armor you are to use have been prepared for you by clever experts. I mean the men who have taught you. It will be your duty from now on to apply these teachings in all walks and conditions of life. You may receive some further instructions in this respect, but each man must himself learn how to make use of the weapons that have been entrusted to him, even those of the spirit.

Your spiritual teacher very wisely emphasized one idea in the magnificent speech he addressed to you when he urged you to be "personalities." This is something which concerns, I believe, every Christian, for there can be no doubt that we are right when we say of our Lord that His was the most personal of all personalities that ever walked this earth.

In the course of your education you have read and heard of many great men — and you will hear of more in the future — wise men, statesmen, kings, princes, and poets. You have read what this one or that one has said and have been inspired by his words. Certainly! for what German youth would not feel ennobled and enraptured by the inspired songs of Körner, for instance?

But these, after all, are only men's words, and

not one of them equals a single word of our Lord. Be sure of this, that you may maintain it, when later in the whirlpool of life you hear others discuss religion and the person of our Lord, and discuss them yourselves. No man's word ever yet has been able to inspire with the same aspirations people of all races and of all nations, that they should all be striving to be like Him, and to sacrifice their lives for Him. This miracle can only be explained by the fact that the words He spoke were the words of the eternal God, and that they can create life and be alive after thousands of years, when the words of the wise men have long been forgotten.

If I look back upon my own personal experiences, I can assure you — and you will have the same experience, yourselves — that the center of our life, especially when it is an active life of responsibility, hinges on the attitude we take toward our Lord and Savior. I have realized this more fully every year.

Because we cannot ignore Him, every man is forced, consciously or unconsciously, to adjust the life he lives, the office he fills, the work he does, to his attitude toward his Savior, and to determine whether his efforts shall be agreeable to the Lord or not. His own conscience, unless it is atrophied, will keep him informed of these matters.

There is only one advice I can give you for your life, and I give it with all my heart. Work and labor incessantly. This is the substance of the Christian life. Look to your Bible and read the parables of our Savior. The indolent man

who remains inactive, satisfied to swim with the tide and to have other people work for him, is most severely punished, as is told in the parable of the pounds. Whatever your preferences or your talents may be, let each one of you endeavor to do his very best in his own sphere and to become a personality, to grow in the performance of his duties, to be active, and to follow the example of our Savior.

Above everything, see to it that all things you do give pleasure, if this is possible, to your fellow-men — for there is nothing more beautiful than to take pleasure jointly with others — and if this is impossible may your work be at least useful as the active and helpful life of our Lord always was. If you do this you will have done what we expected of you, and will be honest German men and useful princes of my house, and you will take part in the work that has been allotted to all of us. May you accomplish this and be blessed, and may God and our Savior help you! This is our wish today.”

Another speech of the Emperor has a special significance because he used the expression the “German Empire Oak.” This figure of speech appealed to the people, who added it to the rich storehouse of imagery of the German language.

The address was delivered on February 3, 1899, at a dinner which the president of the province of Brandenburg had arranged for the members of the provincial diet. Brandenburg

was the earliest of the provinces of the present Kingdom of Prussia entrusted to the care of the Hohenzollerns. The Emperor seems to have an especially warm place in his heart for the sons of Brandenburg:

My dear Mr. President and Men of Brandenburg: —

The address which we have just heard gave a most patriotic survey, poetically embellished, of the deeds of the Hohenzollerns and the history of our people. I believe I am expressing your own feelings when I say that two factors made it possible for my ancestors to solve their problems as they did. One, and the chief factor, was that they of all the princes at a time when such thoughts and feelings were not yet universal, realized their personal responsibility toward God, and acted accordingly, and the other, that they had the support of the people of Brandenburg.

Put yourselves back for a moment to the time when Lord Frederick I was appointed Elector here, and exchanged his splendid home in Franconia for the March of Brandenburg. According to the historians, the conditions here at that time were such that we today can barely conceive of them. We can therefore understand Lord Frederick's action only if we assume that he felt it his duty to accept the country which the emperor's favor had bestowed on him. He was eager to introduce in Brandenburg system and order, not only because he wished to please

the emperor, and himself, but because he believed Heaven had assigned to him this task. Similar motives we can trace with all my ancestors. Their big wars with other countries, and their institutions and laws at home were ever inspired by the one feeling of responsibility to the people who had been given into their keeping, and the country which had been entrusted to them.

The president of the province has kindly referred to our trip to Palestine and what I did there. I am free to say that I have had many and varied experiences of an elevating nature in that country, partly religious, partly historical, and partly, also, connected with modern life. My most inspiring experience, however, next to the service in our own church, was to stand on the Mount of Olives and see the spot at its base where the greatest struggle of the world was fought—by the One Man—for the redemption of mankind. This realization induced me to renew on that day my oath of allegiance, as it were, to God on high. I swore to do my very best to knit my people together and to destroy whatever could disintegrate them.

During my stay in that foreign country where we Germans miss the woods and the beautiful sheets of water which we love, I often thought of the lakes of Brandenburg and their clear, somber depths and of our forests of oaks and pines, and then I said to myself that after all we are far happier here than in foreign lands, although the other people of Europe often pity us.

Speaking of trees, and our care and love of them, I am reminded of an incident which is of interest to us who have begun to assist the growth of the German Empire. It happened after the great and inspiring events of 1870-71. The troops had returned, the exultation had abated, people had resumed their former labors, and the work of solidifying and developing the new fatherland was beginning. The three paladins of the grand old Emperor, the great general, the mighty chancellor, and the faithful minister of war, had sat down to a meal, for the first time alone. When they had drunk their first glass to the sovereign and the Empire, the chancellor turned to his companions and said: "Now we have obtained everything for the realization of which we have been fighting, struggling, and suffering. We have reached the highest goal of which we ever dared to dream. After our experiences what more can there be to interest and to inspire us?" There was a brief pause, and then the old director of battles said, "To see the tree grow!" And the room was very still.

Yes, gentlemen, the tree which we must watch and care for is the German Empire Oak. It is bound to grow, because it has the protection of the men of Brandenburg. Here are its roots. It has weathered many a storm, and has often almost died, but its roots and shoots, firmly planted in Brandenburg soil, will keep, God grant, in all eternity!

The wish to bring about peace among all the people is magnificent, but one big mistake is

generally made in all such calculations. As long as unregenerated sin rules among men, there will be war and hatred, envy and discord, and one man will try to get the better of another. The law of men, is also the law of nations. Let us Germans, therefore, hold together like a solid rock! And may every wave which threatens peace, far away or at home in Europe, dash in vain against this immovable rock — the German people!

Finally, one other speech may be quoted here, because it expresses the conviction of the best minds of Germany, namely that Germany can only thrive if her sons are morally strong and proof against the temptations of pride and envy. This speech was delivered on April 24, 1901, to the students of the University of Bonn, when the Emperor's oldest son, the Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, entered the university:

My Dear Young Fellow-Students: I need not tell you how my heart delights at being once more in my beloved Bonn and in a company of students. My mind reverts to the glorious picture of glistening sunshine and happiness which filled my stay here years ago. Joy of life, joy in the people, young and old, and above all joy in the new German Empire, growing stronger every day!

It is therefore naturally my dearest wish that my beloved son whom I am now placing among

you, shall be vouchsafed as happy student days as I once had. And how could he possibly not have them? Is not Bonn, this lovely town, accustomed to the activities of jolly youths, and by nature as if created for this purpose!

But more! Bonn is built on the Rhine! 'Tis here our vines grow, and here our traditions are rich, for here every castle and every town is eloquent of our past. Let Father Rhine exert his charm also on the Crown Prince as on all of you! And when the cup passes from hand to hand and the songs are gay, let your souls delight in the glorious moments, and dip deep into them, as becomes German fellows in the prime of life. But let the spring whence you draw your pleasure be as pure and clear as the golden juice of the grapes, and as deep and lasting as Father Rhine! Let us look about us in the blessed Rhinish lands, where our past rises in visible form! Rejoice, my friends, that you are German youths, when you pass from Aachen to Mainz, that is from Charles the Great to Germany's era of splendor under Barbarossa!

Why did this splendor not last? Why did the German Empire decay? Because the old Empire was not built on a strictly national basis. The cosmopolitan idea of the old Roman Empire of German nationality did not permit a development along German national lines. A nation is only possible when a demarkation line exists between it and foreign people, when its own men and women have personalities to correspond to their racial peculiarities. Barbarossa's glory had to wane, and the old Empire had to crumble

because its cosmopolitism prevented the process of a national crystallization of the whole. Here and there a smaller district was firmly knit into a principality and formed the nucleus of a future State. Unfortunately this necessitated a conflict between such a State and its leader on the one hand, and the Emperor and the Empire serving the cosmopolitan idea on the other. Thus the Empire, declining in vigor, lost also its internal peace. It is a pity that we must write also over this phase in the development of our German people the weighty words of Tacitus, who knew Germany so well, *Propter invidiam* (Because of envy)! The princes were jealous of the Emperor's power, just as they had been jealous of Arminius, in spite of his victory. The nobility was jealous of the growing wealth of the cities, and the peasants envied the nobles. What fatal consequences and bitter harm has not come to our dear and beautiful Germany *propter invidiam*! The banks of the Rhine have a story to tell of this. Well, what once could not be done, God finally granted it to one man to achieve!

Aachen and Mainz are historical memories. But in German breasts there had survived the longing to be united into one nation, and Emperor William the Great brought it about, with the assistance of his faithful servants. Let us then turn our eyes to Koblenz, to the German Square, and to Rüdesheim, to the Niederwald, where great monuments teach you that now you are Germans in German lands and citizens of a well-defined German nation. You will have to do your share of the work for its safety and

development, and you are here to prepare yourselves for this work. The Empire stands before you; it is thriving gloriously. Let joy and gratitude fill your hearts; and may you glow with the firm and manly resolve to work for Germany as Germans and to lift her and strengthen her! The future is waiting for you. It will test your strength. Do not waste it in cosmopolitan dreams, or in one-sided party service, but exert it to make stable the national idea and to foster the noblest thoughts.

The spiritual heroes whom God's grace permitted the German race to produce, from Boniface and Walther von der Vogelweide to Goethe and Schiller are great. They have given light and have been a blessing to all mankind. Their work was universal, but they were Germans in the strictest sense, they were well-defined personalities, and in short, men! Men we need today more than ever. May you too strive to be men!

How is this possible? Who can show you the way? There is only one whose name we all bear, who has borne our sins and blotted them out, who has shown us by His life and work how we shall live and work, our Lord and Savior. May He sow into your hearts moral seriousness, that your motives may be pure and your aims high. Love of father and mother, of home and fatherland, depends on love of Him. If you have this you will be proof against all temptations, especially against pride and envy, and will be able to sing and say, "We Germans fear God and naught else in the world." If

this is the case, we shall stand firm in this world, and be able to spread culture. When I shall see such a generation gather and grow up about my son I shall be well satisfied to close my eyes when the time comes, for then the rallying cry will be, "Germany, Germany, above everything!"

With confident heart I give you the toast, "Long live the University of Bonn!"

These few speeches do not, of course, develop a complete picture of the many-sided character of Emperor William. They may, however, explain why the Germans love him, and why they are sure that no selfish motives influence his actions.

There has been not a little talk of a "military clique," which is said to surround the Emperor and through him to dictate the policy of the Empire. He probably has his special friends, but he is in constant touch with representative men from all walks of life, and no complaint has been heard in Germany during his reign that it was difficult to reach his ear. The fact is that the communal and individual life of Germany is so thoroughly democratic and that the men at the heads of the various departments are drawn from so wide a range of social antecedents that it is no longer possible to speak of a "clique" as in control of the government.

One other erroneous notion may finally be

commented upon in passing. Many people have believed that the Emperor could institute proceedings of *lèse majesté*. He cannot do anything of the kind. There are several paragraphs of the legal code dealing with slander and insults against the Crown, their prosecution, however, is the same as that of other crimes and misdemeanors, and is in the hands of the district attorneys.

From whatever side the problem is attacked, one always returns to the same conclusion that Emperor William is well spoken of at home, not because he is, or for that matter could be, autocratic, but because his aims, throughout his reign, have been the aims of the healthily pulsating life of Germany: Peace and Progress!

CHAPTER IV

THE PAST

THE earliest record of the German people is contained in the writings of Tacitus, a Roman historian of the first century of our era, who shows that both their virtues and their faults were apparent even then. Their morality, he said, accomplished more than elsewhere the best of laws, while their love of individual freedom made them impatient of restrictions, prevented the formation of strong States, and rendered them an easy prey of foreign invaders. Whatever the Germans have since achieved has been the result of their individually high morality and whatever ills they have suffered has been largely due to their own petty jealousies.

Unlike the other great nations of Europe the Germans discovered the value of a well conceived national idea late. It was Bismarck who preached it to them, and who taught them that "no strong national existence is possible without a sufficiently broad, local basis." This local basis was supplied in 1871 by the federation of the German States under the presidency of the

King of Prussia who bears the name of German Emperor.

The creation of the Empire, however, would have been insufficient and would not have made a world power of Germany, if it had not been supplemented by the *popular will to be worthy of a great past and the hope of a great future*.

If one wishes to value the aspirations of Germany today, one must know how this past appears to her people, how they expect to prove themselves worthy of it, and what thoughts they have of the future.

The history of all people down to the French Revolution is the history of men rather than of popular forces; not that the will of the people had not made itself felt in earlier times, but that it is much easier to understand the concrete achievements of individuals than the abstract workings of national ideas.

From Charlemagne, who proudly placed the Emperor's crown on his own head in Rome on Christmas eve of the year 800, down to the time of Emperor Barbarossa whose name is even today known and loved in every German house, the Empire grew in strength and in prosperity. "There was no prince in this world comparable to the German Emperors, and German knights and German women were the flowers of creation. The thrift of the burghers brought wealth to

the cities, and the honesty and loyalty of the peasants became proverbial."

Such are the pictures unrolled in school to the children, such the stories told in countless books written for and eagerly read by the masses. Everywhere the cardinal virtues of chastity, loyalty, honesty, and thrift are glorified, and everywhere the convictions of the readers are strengthened that these are the virtues which distinguished their ancestors. Nor are the pictures wholly invented. In a world which was only slowly transforming itself from a barbaric to a civilized state, the high personal morality of the Germans stood out from the gloom of vicious habits like stars on a darkened sky.

Frederic Redbeard, that is Barbarossa, ruled from 1152-1190. He conquered Italy in six campaigns, and the stories of warmth and beauty and sunshine south of the Alps which his soldiers brought back to Germany, surrounded the Emperor with a halo of heavenly splendor. A touch of the mysterious was added when the news reached home that he had suddenly died in Asia Minor on a crusade against the Turks.

His immediate successors were less strong, but then came the reign of Emperor Frederick II, 1215-1250, the most splendid of all. In spite of wars and minor revolutions the spiritual life of Germany was waking to the sunshine of a

new day in the world's history. The Nibelungenlied was composed, and Hartmann von der Aue, Wolfram von Eschenbach and Gottfried von Strassburg inspired the Germans with their epics, while Walther von der Vogelweide touched their hearts with his poems.

Soon after Frederick's death dissensions racked the Empire, which was quickly dismembered. In the hearts and minds of the people, however, the great Emperors continued to live. Their memories were blended into one, and the fable grew up of Emperor Barbarossa sleeping in Kyffhauser Mountain in Saxony, whence he would issue some day, when the Empire should rise again in splendor, and a new era begin for the German people.

Early in the nineteenth century Rückert gave poetic form to these hopes of the Germans. The poem translated¹ reads:

The ancient Barbarossa,
Friedrich, the Kaiser great,
Within the castle-cavern
Sits in enchanted state.

He did not die; but ever
Waits in the chamber deep,
Where hidden under the castle
He sat himself to sleep.

¹ *German Classics*, Vol. V. p. 486. German Publication Society, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York.

The splendor of the Empire
He took with him away,
And back to earth will bring it
When dawns the promised day.

The chair is ivory purest
Whereof he makes his bed;
The table is of marble
Whereon he props his head.

His beard, not flax, but burning
With fierce and fiery glow,
Right through the marble table
Beneath his chair does grow.

He nods in dreams and winketh
With dull, half-open eyes,
And once a page he beckons —
A page that standeth by.

He bids the boy in slumber:
“O dwarf, go up this hour,
And see if still the ravens
Are flying round the tower;

And if the ancient ravens
Still wheel above us here,
Then must I sleep enchanted
For many a hundred year.”

Americans have wondered at times why the Germans founded an Empire in 1871 when they might have had a republic. Oppressed through centuries, torn by dissension, by jealousy at home and by grudging neighbors, the Germans had centered all their expectations on the re-

vival of their former splendor; and this revival had always been connected in their minds with the reappearance of their Emperor. For the Germans, 1871 was the culmination of countless hopes. Without them they would have been unable to put aside everything that through generations had kept them separated, and made them the play-ball of fate, and the laughing-stock of England and of France.

While the death of Emperor Frederick marked the end of the period of greatest outward splendor for Germany, the mental and commercial life of the people continued to develop marvelously. The German Hansa, an alliance of cities which were great centers of commerce, grew to proportions which even to-day would be called enormous. Belgium and Holland were then parts of the Empire, and their ports, together with those of Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, and Danzig, did practically all the business of the world. It has been claimed that in season ships cleared the great ports at the rate of a ship a minute.

Minds were active everywhere, art flourished, universities were founded, inventions were made, and prejudices were being discarded — when the greatest misfortune overtook the Germans that can befall a people. They were rent in twain by religious dissension, fiercer than had been

known in the world before. Father and son fought each other, brother killed brother, and whoever had the upper hand in a district tried to make converts or kill the heretics. And there was no one strong enough to stop the bloodshed and remind Catholics and Protestants alike that they were Germans.

The result was the Thirty Years' War, 1608-1648, which devastated the country and numbed the people, decimated their numbers, and made all memories of former splendor almost incredible myths.

In the generations which followed the other great nations of Europe forged ahead. The former German Empire, while still holding together nominally, was a loosely knit association of States. The more prosperous southern and western States despised their poverty-stricken brethren in the north, and both were used by France or England to fight their battles for them. The proud Louis XIV brought much misery to the remnants of France's earlier rival. Some provinces he took after successful wars, others he stole in times of peace, outright. No German prince dared to gainsay him.

At last, however, in the poor soil of the north a new people grew up in the strict school of discipline and justice. Their masters were the princes of Hohenzollern who had exchanged

their Frankish homes for the March of Brandenburg. Ridiculed at first, the Great Elector, in the seventeenth century, won final recognition by his victories over the invading French and Swedish troops. His ships sailed the oceans, and even appeared on the west coast of Africa. He strengthened his country and joined to it the province of Prussia, where his son Frederick crowned himself king on January 18, 1701, and which gave its name to the new kingdom.

From then on the history of Prussia is well known. Frederick II, the Great, established order and a firm government in his kingdom after he had defended it against the world at incredible odds. His reputation spread through Europe and across the sea, and for the first time for generations, a German in foreign lands could feel proud again at being a German.

Brought up in the hard school of want and obedience, the Prussian character, while efficient, appeared to the other people austere and wanting in the graces of human intercourse. But it was this very character, reliable and indomitable, which at last brought about the new German Empire. First, however, it had to be chastened and suffer much in the Napoleonic wars. It had to learn the lesson that even the achievements of a Frederick the Great count for naught in the next generation, if this generation does noth-

ing to deserve their blessing. There is no standstill in nature. Either we progress or we must fall behind.

Today Germany has learned her lesson well. She knows that she cannot rest on the successes of 1870 and '71. If she would bring about the splendor of earlier years she must be active. And she has been active, for she knows that the love of the past is valuable only when it contains a promise of the future.

CHAPTER V

THE NEW EMPIRE

FORTY - THREE years of peace must be marked off to the credit of the new German Empire.

This is almost the half-century which Moltke prophesied it would take before the Germans could feel secure in their new possession. Fifty years, he said, they must stand fully armed to defend themselves against a world which hates new-comers. After that they may relax their vigilance.

These forty-three years have seen a marvelous development.

To begin, the increase of the population has been very rapid, amounting today to more than 800,000 annually. The Germans grow so rapidly that they "gain in three years as many people as there are Swiss people in the world, in six years as many as inhabit Holland and Sweden, and in a generation as many as all the Spaniards and Portuguese combined." ¹

¹ The quotations in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are from Paul Rohrbach, *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, 1912.

A normally rapid increase in population among a civilized people is an indication of its high state of morality; while more than once in history the decline of a nation has been preceded by a constantly falling birth rate. The love of married life and of many children is the best measure of a people's inner and outer state of health.

"The blessing of many children," Paul Rohrbach says, "is still with us, in spite of all difficulties, as an after effect of those centuries which have kept their meaning alive in our morals and religion, and as the result of nature's own sense of life trying to maintain itself against the cold doctrine of utility. To the extent to which nature and the strong mating sense of the past grow dull, we must take active steps toward recognizing that the bearing of children is a public achievement, unless we are willing as a nation to retrograde. Above everything, we shall have to make it easier for the woman to be a mother. This is the first and the most difficult problem of the woman question."

The greatest achievements of the new Empire are connected with steps taken to make the problems of life easier for those people who, with small returns, contribute their all to the prosperity of the State. These are the workingmen, and as the result of much wise legislation their

lot in Germany is better today than anywhere else in the world. The credit of having taken the initiative in this whole movement belongs to Emperor William I. At his request Bismarck introduced the first bills in the Reichstag and laid down the general principles which have guided all subsequent laws. Replying to an opponent's advice to go slow, because the State was responsible for everything it did, Bismarck said :

Gentlemen: I feel that the State may become responsible also for the things it does *not* do. No State can safely practice the *laissez faire*, *laissez aller* theory, and all the unadulterated political theories of Manchester, such as "let each one do what he chooses, and fare as he will", or "who is not strong enough to stand, let him fall", or "he who has will receive more, and he who has not, from him let us take."

At present our poor-laws keep the injured laboring man from starvation. According to law nobody need starve. Whether in reality this never happens I do not know. But this is not enough, if the man is to look contentedly into the future and to his own old age. The present bill intends to keep the sense of human dignity alive, which even the poorest German should enjoy if I have my way. He should feel that he is no mere almstaker, when he is sick or old, but that he possesses a fund which is his very own. No one shall have the right to dis-

pose of it, or to take it from him, however poor he may be. This fund will open for him many a door and secure for him better treatment.

Alms constitute the first step of Christian charity, such as must exist to a great extent in countries like France, where they have no poor-laws, and where every poor man has the right to starve to death. This is the first Christian duty, and the second is the assistance commanded by law and given by individual communities. A State, however, it seems to me, which is composed very largely of Christians, should let itself be permeated with the principles which it confesses, and especially with those which have to do with helping our neighbors, and show sympathy for the lot which is threatening the old and the sick.

These words were spoken April 2, 1881, and may be said to have been the text on which the whole fabric of German welfare legislation has been built. As a result the conditions of the German laboring men are better than they are anywhere in the world — this at least is the belief of the Germans. Emigration consequently has fallen off to a point where it is practically non-existing, or to quote the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*: “During the last ten years there was on balance no emigration from Germany. On the contrary, there was immigration; whereas from England the emigration has

lately been on an average between 200,000 and 300,000 (annually)."¹

The full importance of these figures is seen when one realizes that also Germany used to have an emigration of about 200,000 annually before she was well started on her social welfare legislation. Today she has an annual excess of immigration over emigration of more than half a million souls annually. Germany has become a good place in which to live, and in which "to look contentedly into the future and to one's old age," even if one is simply a poor man.

This should never be forgotten in a discussion of the causes of the present war. The laboring men, and that means the overwhelming majority of all the people, were living under conditions which they considered better than those in other countries, and which the constantly broadening labor laws promised to improve as time went on, provided, always, that the growth of German industry and commerce continued to keep step with the increase of the population by birth and immigration.

How phenomenal this growth of the German industry has been in recent years appears from the comparative table in the Journal just quoted.

¹ J. Ellis Barker, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, London, July, 1914, p. 813.

It grew 204 per cent. from 1888 to 1912, while the British growth was only 100.7 per cent. in the same time.

The average German, however, was satisfied to know that the German industry was growing at a rate which gave steady employment not only to all those willing to work in any one year but found new employment every year for the additional 800,000, which is the average annual increase of population; yes, even for more because Germany has an excess immigration of several hundred thousand.

The question, therefore, arose "Is the growth of our industry assured for all times, or are there forces at work in the world which would retard or destroy it?"

People have said "Why can the Germans not be satisfied with the commerce they enjoy at present? Why must they poke their noses into every corner of the world, when they know that this must arouse English animosity?"

The answer is very simple. Because they have to feed each year at least one million mouths more than they had to feed the previous year, and because their morality forbids them to adopt the small family or even the "no children" system of other nations.

A standstill, therefore, for Germany under present conditions was out of the question. She

had to find ever new markets of the world, or starve.

This, however, brought her into dangerous competition with the country that loves to call herself the "Mistress of the Sea," and which, having had a start of centuries, regarded the giant strides of the Germans with distrust.

In Germany the feeling grew that England wished to destroy the world-markets of her rival, and history seemed to bear this out, for had England not destroyed or attached to herself in turn the great world commerce of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, and the United States? The merchant marines of all these nations had fallen a prey to England, because in the hour of need they had not been defended by a sufficiently large navy. It was, therefore, the duty of Germany to build a navy, not for the sake of aggression, but to defend her world commerce if England should find an opportune moment of attack. This was Germany's view of the case.

England, however, feared lest the German navy grow too strong to be merely defensive. She knew that Germany needed new markets and opportunities every year, and suspected that some day her rival, unable to create new markets, would try to rob her by force of her own.

In a perfectly natural way, therefore, feelings

of mistrust began to separate the English from the Germans, who by all the laws of nature should stand side by side in this world in a joint effort to advance the sum total of civilization.

That the great clash had to come in 1914 is the more regrettable since friends of peace had detected the approach to a better understanding between the Germans and the English. It is now well known that the German Chancellor had launched on a distinctly friendly English policy some years ago. No one, however, probably has stated the case so well as Lord Welby, who is quoted in the July number of the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (1914, pp. 807, 808) as follows:

I and my generation, which of course goes back to a very distant period, are astounded, and rightly astounded, at the progress Germany has made in the last sixty or seventy years. The Germany we remember of the fifties was a cluster of insignificant States under insignificant princelings, headed by the so-called hegemony of Prussia and Austria, intriguing against each other, with the result that Germany was really of no account in the world either as a power, or as a nation. I ask you to compare this with the picture Mr. Crammond's paper ("Economic Relations of the British and German Empires") has shown you, and compare it with the figures and with the marvelous prog-

ress which is marked in almost every branch of German industry. You must feel that Bismarck added a great and new industrial force to the productive power of the world. As far as I am concerned, I hail with pleasure the development of Germany, and I think most of my hearers will agree with me in what, if I remember rightly, Mr. Balfour laid down with very great force, that it is a great mistake ever to think that the development of one country is acquired at the expense of another. The real fact of the matter is that the development of one country really adds a fresh source of supply to the industries of other countries. And therefore as far as those relations (with Germany) are concerned, I think you must all feel that the development of Germany is of great benefit to the world.

Those were generous and true words, unfortunately much at variance with expressions which have since fallen from the lips of the King and of several of the British ministers. The fact is, the two countries have never quite understood each other. But since Lord Welby's words are true, and will live, and the others will evanesce as passion dies, the sooner both England and Germany realize that neither country will gain by destroying the prosperity of the other the better it will be for both.

One hopeful sign that this realization may dawn upon the people soon is found in the mag-

nificent spirit of manly chivalry which has not deserted all the leaders in the two countries. One of the noblest documents of this war is the Proclamation issued August 5, 1914, by the British Acting Governor of the Gold Coast:

There are amongst us now certain German subjects under the greatest misfortune that can fall upon the people of a martial race — that they cannot be in their own country when war has descended upon it. Let me call to your minds that some of them have lived many years on the Gold Coast, engaged to the benefit of its population in missionary, medical, and mercantile work; that some of them are our personal friends; and that from all we have received acts of kindness and assistance. They are entitled to more than our charity, they are entitled to our chivalry.

Let, therefore, the chiefs make it known that they will lay a very heavy hand on any of their people who seek occasion to insult or molest those who have for many years been amongst us as our good friends and guests. For some years the Gold Coast has been traveling along the easy paths of peace and prosperity. It is for its people to show now that they possess courage and obedience, the virtues most needed when the way is difficult, for war means, even to the victor, not victory only but hardship, confusion, and scarcity. Let us support the chances of war calmly, patiently, and resolutely in the English fashion. Let there be no vain boasting

and no cowardly despair. If you can show stern qualities in time of trial your name will be far stronger than years of prosperity could ever have made it.

This language is understood by people of all lands. If there were more Germans and Englishmen to speak it their countries would soon outgrow their suspicions, and England rest assured that no danger is lurking for her in Germany's prosperity.

CHAPTER VI

RUSSIA, THE SLAVS, AND GERMANY

THE Russians are Slavs, but it is a great mistake to assume that everybody who has suffered at the hands of autocratic Russia blames the Slavs for his experiences.

Most Germans of the northeastern provinces, whether or not they know it, have Slav blood in their veins. It has even been claimed that Prussia succeeded in building up a strong State of its own, and later of founding the new Empire, because she was not obliged to deal with the centrifugal forces of pure-blooded Germans.

Many Slavs in Western Russia, Poland, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungaria, are as highly civilized as any people in the world. They are even apt to give one the impression of a higher civilization, because their culture is personal rather than national. In the Dual Monarchy, for instance, any distinctly Slavic national pursuit of culture would drive the Slavs away from the centers of greater culture to the less advanced strongholds of Slavic thought.

In Russia, on the other hand, the gulf which separates the spiritual horizon of the upper classes from that of the masses is so incalculably great that it is impossible to speak of a national state of Russian culture. No one who has not seen the peasants in the interior of the country has any idea of the kind of human material of which the hundred million Russians largely consist today. You could not call them poor, just as you would never think of applying this term to any of your household pets. They do their work, they get their food, and then they sleep, with an occasional fight by way of diversion.

Some writers have favorably commented on the treatment which the peasants receive from the great lords, in whose demeanor there is not the least arrogance. You might as well expect arrogance in the way a man addresses his horse. Wherever the remotest chance of claiming equality is absent on the one part the narrow defense of arrogance on the other part is obviously not called for.

These peasants cling to their native land with a pertinacity which hints of the fine qualities dormant within them. They are all of one religion, the Greek Orthodox — the exceptions are very few — and the Czar, their “little father,” as they call him, is for them God’s representative on earth. They are either absolutely faithful,

like well trained dogs, or they turn upon their masters with a ferocity quite unknown in the West.

Their ideas of right and wrong are very positive and in order to arouse the peasants to warfare, they must be told the most outrageous tales about their enemies. Once aroused they try to wreak vengeance on the enemy commensurable with the distorted picture of them which their masters have drawn.

The result is, of course, the barbarous warfare which has often characterized the Russian campaigns. An army which consists largely of Russian peasants cannot be held in check by the best and most humane of officers. The so-called Cossacks are mounted troops from the interior and of very much the same character.

The fecundity of the Russian peasant class is enormous, but since the death rate is also very large, owing to ignorance and the lack of sanitation, the rate of increase in the Russian population is only very little more than that of Germany.

If ignorance in its literal sense, that is absence of all knowledge, is characteristic of large numbers of the lower classes, dishonesty, that is graft in its most offensive kind, is characteristic of many of the higher officials. When the writer was in Russia a few years ago his baggage was

stolen as he was on the point of crossing into Persia. In his endeavor to trace it, he was held up for a bribe by one person after another. His last interview was with the chief of police, who doubled the original demand of five rubles, and when they were not paid, declared his inability to do anything. The writer having heard of the arrival of the governor in Erivan, refused the chief's demands, and called on the governor, whose name was known to him as that of one of the noblest families of Russia. The governor was very gracious, listened attentively, and with growing annoyance, to the complaint. At last he jumped up, very angry. "Oh, these petty thieves," he exclaimed over and over again as he paced the floor, "Oh, these petty thieves —" Suddenly he stopped before his visitor, looked him square in the eye, slapped him cordially on the shoulder, as if a thought had just come to him, and cried, "I'll tell you what! Give me twenty-five rubles, and I will see that you get your baggage tomorrow!" He was as good as his word.

Graft and lying have ever gone hand in hand, and those who know the country believe that even the Czar has no idea of what is really going on in the Empire. At the outbreak of the present war the Czar and his ministers gave assurances "on their honor" which were at variance with

the best obtainable information concerning the Russian mobilization. It is quite possible that they believed what they said, but that they did not know. Later in the fall of this year, it is said, the Czar had intended to test the rapidity of the mobilization of his troops in a grand manœuvre. On a certain day he was to issue his orders of mobilization and when it was complete the generals were to report to him.

Russian generals would not be Russian, as travelers use this term, if they had not taken precautionary measures to be well within the time limit expected of them. It would therefore be not at all surprising if they had begun their mobilization secretly and weeks in advance of time.

To realize why Russian mobilization must be slow, one has only to glance at the records of the Russian railway rolling stock.¹ The whole empire, in Europe as well as in Asia, owns less than 20,000 passenger coaches, 1,000 of which are parlor cars! The total seating capacity of these coaches is less than 700,000, while the German seating capacity is four times as great, and if one compares the distances in Germany with those in Russia, not four times but more nearly forty times as great! Russia has less

¹ Statistics published in *North German Gazette*, August 23, 1914, Second edition, page 2.

than 400,000 freight cars, while Germany has almost 600,000 freight cars.

This is the reason why Russia needs time to concentrate her millions of soldiers, and if she is beaten anywhere finds it difficult to escape as complete a defeat as that of Tannenberg in East Prussia, where four and one half Russian army corps were so completely destroyed that no mention of them has occurred in subsequent despatches, and over 90,000 unwounded prisoners were taken. These figures are so enormous that few American papers have believed them. But the man who knows the swamps and lakes of that region, with their distant crown of beautiful hills, and knows the Russians, and is told how the German general succeeded in placing his cannon on those hills, sees nothing improbable in the official report from Berlin. Nor is he at all astonished at the denial of the defeat by the Russian generals, for unless the higher Russian officials have very much changed in recent years, they are as ready today as they ever were to play fast and loose with the truth in their reports to the Czar.

In the foreign policy of Russia the great masses of the population cannot be said to have either a voice or an interest except in so far as they have been led to believe that certain things are absolutely necessary for their "little father,"

and that wicked enemies are trying to prevent him from acquiring them.

In this way the minor Slavic races of the Balkans have been represented to the Russians as oppressed by the godless Dual Monarchy, and crying out for the help of God's representative on earth.

The mainspring, however, of Russia's policy has been, for a long time, her need of a harbor which she can use the year around and which has free access to the sea. All her great harbors are ice-blocked in winter or secluded in the Black Sea. From Russia's point of view this demand is natural and fair. The difficulty is that at present no such harbor is to be had for the asking. Constantinople has always appealed to Russia as meeting her wishes. But not to mention the fact that the Turks already possess it, there are other claimants, notably Great Britain and Austria, and latterly one or more of the Balkan States.

When Russia neared Constantinople in her war with the Turks, Great Britain addressed to her the following note, on May 6, 1877. "The vast importance of Constantinople whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view is too well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that Her Majesty's Government are not pre-

pared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessor, of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position."

This has been Great Britain's attitude ever since. Constantinople holds the key not only to Asia Minor and thence to Egypt, but also overland to India. For this reason she cannot view "with indifference" the passing into strong hands, of Constantinople. A strong power firmly established on the Bosphorus would threaten both her African and her Asiatic possessions.

It would probably have been immaterial to Great Britain whether Russia or Austria supplanted the Turks. The important thing was to maintain the *status quo*, for as long as Turkey was strong enough to keep both aspirants at arm's length, and at the same time to maintain a semblance of order in the Balkan States, Great Britain had nothing to fear. This is the reason why she has never exerted her great moral influence in the interest of real reforms in Turkey, where any change could precipitate a catastrophe.

All this might have been of secondary importance for Germany, if she had not been bound to Austria by ties of friendship and treaty obligations.¹ She was, therefore, concerned with

¹ For a discussion of conditions leading up to this treaty see Chap. VII.

the Balkan situation in so far as it touched the vital interests of her ally. How vital these interests are appears from a glance at the map and a brief historical survey.

The Dual Monarchy consists of the great kingdom of Hungary; of those German parts of the old German Empire, dismembered by Napoleon, which were not reëmbodied in the federation of German States of 1871; of Bohemia, and of a few other provinces. The most important are, first, the Tirol and Triest, with the surrounding territory, where there is an Italian population; secondly, Galicia, an original part of Poland, and inhabited by Slavs; and thirdly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, also largely Slavic. On the southern frontier there used to be Turkey. Gradually, however, one State after another won its independence, and today Rumania and Servia are Austria's neighbors in the south. Still farther south are Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia, all original provinces of Turkey, and largely inhabited by Slavs.

The Dual Monarchy is thus surrounded on three sides by Slavic races, for Bohemia in the northwest is inhabited by Czechs, who are Slavs.

At present the German element controls the government in the Dual Monarchy. The mur-

dered archduke, however, who was the heir-apparent, had, it is said, a far-sighted plan, whereby all the races represented in the Empire were to share in the government in proportion to their size and population. He was a friend of the Slavs, not only for political reasons, but sincerely. He even overcame all opposition to a marriage with a lady of Slavish descent, and for the sake of his love for her had to renounce for his children the right of succession to the throne, because she was not of royal blood.

If the archduke had been permitted to carry out his policies he would probably have made a strong Empire of the Dual Monarchy, for, contrary to the general belief, the Austrian Italians, Czechs, Poles, and other Slavs are patriotically Austrian.

Where there is so much foreign propaganda, Russian, Servian, and Italian, all meant to disrupt the Monarchy, it would be dangerous to speak with too much assurance, but visitors to the Tirol, Bohemia, Galicia, and Bosnia have received the impression that the masses in general are satisfied with their Austrian allegiance, and that of the educated people an overwhelming majority feel the same.

This is not surprising, because, barring the Italian Austrians, all the other people in question would exchange a union with a highly civilized

State for one of far less advanced ideas. There can be no doubt that the Bohemians and Galicians are better off now than if they fell under the autocratic sway of the Czar. The greatest losers, however, by a change would be the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These provinces were incorporated into the Dual Monarchy in 1908 after they had been Austrian for all practical purposes through thirty years.

This act of Austria appeared so arbitrary at the time, and is so often mentioned as at the bottom of the present war, that it is advisable to listen also to the Austrian explanation, and to check its credibility by an impartial source of information, such as is contained in the *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*. It is one of the publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and was issued in 1914.

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Senator of France, and Professor Paul Milioukov, member of the Russian Douma, were prominent members of the commission. In addition there were two representatives of Great Britain, one of the United States, one of Austria, one of Germany, and one other Frenchman.

Russia's successful war against Turkey in 1877 was terminated by the Treaty of San Ste-

fano and the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Both these treaties meant a check to the Russian advance toward Constantinople. Russia was, however, permitted to push the entering wedge of her influence into the Turkish Empire by receiving a practically free hand in Bulgaria. This State, while still under the suzerainty of Turkey, was to be independent under Russian tutelage. Since it was obviously unfair to Austria-Hungary to have her powerful neighbor to the north and east, Russia, get a foothold also to the south of her, without being able to exert her own influence in the Balkan provinces, Turkey ceded to her Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose future allegiance to Turkey was to be only nominal. This met with Russia's approval, whose note to Great Britain, June 8, 1877, reads: Bosnia and Herzegovina, "being situated conterminously with Austria-Hungary, give the latter a right to a preponderating voice in their future organization." These provinces were ceded to Austria in July, 1878. They were occupied by Austria on July 28, 1878, and the final treaty with Turkey was signed on April 21, 1879.

Nobody who knows conditions existing in the Balkans at that time will believe that Austria should have taken a plebiscite to see whether the inhabitants wished to leave Turkey and become Austrian. Such things were not done at that

time, the best proof of which is that England forced Turkey to cede to her the island of Cyprus under practically the same conditions on August 14, 1878. Nor has the island since been returned to Turkey or been permitted to form its own government. On the contrary, it has been incorporated into the British body politic.

As soon as Austria took hold of Bosnia and Herzegovina roads and railways were built, telephones and telegraphs installed, rich mines were opened, and best of all, many schools were built. The lower class Mohammedans were altogether illiterate, and of the Catholics less than four per cent. could read or write. Thirty years of good government had placed the provinces on the road to success, when the Balkan troubles began. Bulgaria had long since thrown off Turkish suzerainty and Russian tutelage. Rumania had grown strong, Servia had developed great prowess, and it became apparent that Turkey, driven back unto Constantinople, could not again exert any claims on Bosnia and Herzegovina. As long as these provinces were nominally Turkish, Servia or Bulgaria could have asked them of Turkey with a semblance of right as an indemnity in a war that everybody saw coming, and which actually took place within a few years.

This would have been a misfortune for these provinces, which were thriving under Austrian

rule. The inhabitants are largely Slavs, it is true, but while the Servians and the Bulgarians are also Slavs there never have been greater cruelties recorded than are described in the *Carnegie Report on the Balkan Wars* as having taken place between these two Slavic races. If this Report were not illustrated with photographs of some wretches surviving their tortures, one would hardly believe these accounts. The saddest part of the whole affair is that such excesses are done in the name of freedom, and that Austria's wish to protect the Bosnians from a like fate is heralded to the world as an act of autocracy. No more cruel thing could have been done than to leave the status of Bosnia uncertain, and to expose her to the unspeakable outrages which reduced Macedonia to a wilderness, when Turkey was driven out and the several Slavic States and Greece began to fight among themselves for the possession of Macedonia.

Read the *Carnegie Report on the Balkan Wars*, and then an account of the progress made by Bosnia under Austrian rule from 1878 to 1908. This is the only fair way of deciding the question whether Austria was justified in incorporating these provinces. Many conversant with the conditions in the Balkans believe that Austria would have committed a crime against humanity if she had left Bosnia to be the play-

thing of the lesser Slavic nations, and had permitted her to share the fate of Macedonia.

One other fact which seems to stand out clearly from the Carnegie Report is the improbability of Servia taking any decisive step diplomatically before being assured of Russia's support. One is tempted, in fact, to say that for some time Servia had taken no step which was not really an act of Russia. This statement, it is true, cannot be proved by the Report, but the number of Servian officers and officials on the Russian payroll is enormous.

The murder of the Austrian archduke on June 28, 1914, by Servian assassins, and with weapons supplied from the Servian arsenal by Servian officers, made not nearly the impression on the world at large that it made on Austria. Elsewhere people were too satiated with the horrible accounts from the Balkans, to be startled. If they will, however, imagine such a thing as the murder of the most prominent American by Mexican assassins and with weapons supplied by the Mexican Government, and if they will further imagine the escape of the conspirators into Mexican territory by the help of the Mexican officials, and the Mexican press breaking forth into joyful paeans at the success of the crime, while the Mexican Government was taking no steps against any of the conspirators — then they will

begin to realize the feelings of Austria at the dastardly murder of Serajewo.

This assassination, moreover, was only the culmination of numberless Servian acts designed to disrupt the Dual Monarchy. Russia would gain most by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, and since her strong influence in Serbia is known, the suspicion has grown that some of her leaders were not ignorant of the attempt made on the life of the archduke.

Almost four weeks after the murder Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia. It was very strongly worded and undoubtedly less diplomatic than Great Britain would have written it had she been in Austria's position. The British State papers are always well written, for her world-wide interests have taught her that official documents are strong factors in the shaping of public opinion. They are, therefore, written not only for the benefit of the recipient, but also for the world at large. If Germany and Austria would follow this example they would meet less opposition in foreign countries. It is not so much what they do as the way they do it that offends people.

Germany has only recently acquired the rank of a world power, and is perhaps excusable if she feels that it is more important to be right than to appear right. Such an attitude, however,

is not wise, for it may convey the impression to distant people that their opinion is not valued, and that, of course, is offensive.

A more temperately worded ultimatum to Servia might have won the sympathy of the world for Austria, instead of seemingly proving Servia's contention that the Dual Monarchy was arbitrary. People in possession of the facts cannot for one instant believe that Bosnia would be better off if she were united with Servia, but the vast majority of the people cannot know all the facts, and since Austria's note appeared to be arbitrary, it was natural for people to assume that her rule was also arbitrary.

When Russia mobilized and apparently supported the Servians, Germany was placed before the dilemma of breaking faith with her ally, or of facing a possible war with Russia. The Germans believe that their government was influenced in its action solely by its desire to be faithful to an ally in its hour of need.

Worldly wisdom, however, would have counseled the same course. If Germany had forsaken Austria in July, 1914, she would undoubtedly have postponed the evil day, but when at last that day had come, Germany would have been obliged to fight entirely alone, for Austria could not have forgiven her desertion.

In this connection Bismarck's explanation of

the alliance with Austria is important. He made it in the Reichstag on February 6, 1888, two days after the treaty had been published. This should be borne in mind, for anti-German publicists have given as one of their reasons why they could not sympathize with Germany their belief that secret alliances are at the bottom of the great war. Germany's treaties are and have been for years public property, while some of the agreements of the allies have been and still are secret.

Bismarck explained that Germany had owed a debt of gratitude to Russia for her support during the Napoleonic wars, and that this realization had determined his unwavering support of Russian demands at all international conferences where Germany had had a voice. Russia, nevertheless, had felt aggrieved at her failure to reach closer to Constantinople after her war with Turkey in 1877, and had blamed Germany for it. "What then was my surprise and natural disappointment," said Bismarck, "when gradually a sort of newspaper campaign began in St. Petersburg, which attacked the German policy, and cast suspicion on my personal intentions. These attacks increased in the following year to the strong request, in 1879, for pressure to be exerted by us in Austria in matters where we could not attack the Austrian rights as such. I

could not consent, for if we should have been estranged from Austria, we should necessarily have fallen into a dependence on Russia, unless we had been satisfied with standing entirely alone in Europe. Would such a dependence have been bearable? Formerly I had believed it might be, when I had said to myself: 'We have no conflicting interests at all. There is no reason why Russia should ever cancel her friendship.' But the Russian behavior concerning the Congress disappointed me, and told me that we were not protected from being drawn into a conflict with Russia against our wishes, even if we placed our policy (for a time) completely at her disposal. . . . This is the origin of our Austrian treaty."

Twenty-six years have passed since Bismarck said this, and in spite of frequent attempts at a better understanding Russia has never forgotten that it was the voice of Germany which, as she believes, turned the scales in favor of Turkey and kept the Russian people out of Constantinople.

The stronger Germany grew and the more faithful she proved to her allies the less willing was Russian public opinion to look for friendship with her western neighbor. On the contrary the conviction increased that Germany stood in the way of Russian aspirations. This

feeling is well expressed in the words which have often appeared in the Russian press, and which have been heard in the conversation of people everywhere, occasionally even in high quarters: "The Russian road to Constantinople goes through Berlin."

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY AND CONTINENTAL EUROPE

PRESENT - DAY writers have to contend with the difficulty of seeming to present *ex parte* evidence. No such presumption attaches to speeches delivered long before the war and addressed to the Germans exclusively. They explain, for instance, what Germany really believed when she laid the foundations for her army and navy, and are, therefore, invaluable for the man who wishes to form his own opinion on the causes of the European war.

The reasons which induced the German Government to propose a great increase in its military strength in 1888, and which made the Reichstag willing to vote the necessary funds, are contained in a speech by Bismarck,¹ delivered February 6, 1888, and known under the title "We Germans fear God and Naught else in the World."

¹ An excellent collection of Bismarck's speeches in translation is given in the *German Classics*, edited by Prof. Kuno Francke, and published by the German Publication Society, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York.

Bismarck left the elucidation of the bill for which he was speaking to his assistants, and gave his hearers a survey of the recent history of Europe in so far as it touched Germany. He assured the Reichstag that Germany was compelled to be strong because she was placed in the heart of Europe amidst warlike nations and because she would have to defend her union. He urged a strong army of defence, and promised that Germany should never use it as a means of attack. His arguments proved convincing, and it must be admitted that Germany has never intentionally deviated from the principles he laid down. He said in part:

I am confident that the German Reichstag will grant us an increase in our armed force, and will do so, not on account of the position in which we happen to find ourselves, nor of any fears which may be swaying the stock exchange and public opinion, but because of an anticipatory estimate of the general conditions of Europe. In addressing you, therefore, I shall have to say more about these conditions than about the bill.

A year ago we were largely concerned with the possible cause of war emanating from France. Since then a peace-loving president has dropped the reins of government, and another peace-loving president has succeeded him. It is a favorable sign that the French Government did not dip into Pandora's box in calling to office another chief magistrate, and that we may be assured of

the continuance under President Carnot of the peaceful policy which President Grévy was known to represent. Changes in the French cabinet are even more reassuring than the change in the presidency, where a great many different reasons had to be considered. The ministers who might have been ready to subordinate the peace of their own country and of Europe to their personal plans have resigned, and others have taken their places of whom we need not fear this. I believe, therefore, that I may state that our outlook toward France is more peaceful and less explosive today than it was a year ago, and I am glad to do this, because I wish to quiet, not to excite, public opinion.

The fears which have sprung up during the last twelve months have had to do more with Russia than with France, or I may say with the exchange of excitement, threats, insults, and challenges in the French and Russian papers during the past summer.

Nevertheless, I believe that our relations with Russia have not changed from what they were last year. The only events which could have occasioned a change of opinion are the attitude of the Russian press and the allocation of the Russian troops.

As regards the press, I cannot assign any importance to it *per se*. People say that it is of greater consequence in Russia than in France. I believe the very opposite to be true. In France the press is a power influencing the decisions of the government. In Russia it is not, nor can it be. In both cases, however, the press is, so far

as I am concerned, mere printer's ink on paper, against which we do not wage war. It cannot contain a challenge for us. Back of each article in the press there stands, after all, only the single man who guided the pen which launched this particular article into the world.

I now come to the other point, the allocation of the troops. It used to take place on a big scale, but only since 1879, when the Turkish war was concluded, has it assumed the proportions which today seem threatening. It may easily appear as if this accumulation of Russian troops near the German and Austrian frontiers—where their support is more difficult and more expensive than farther inland—could only be dictated by the intention of surprising and attacking one of the neighbors unprepared, *sans dire gare!* (I cannot for the moment think of the German expression.) Well, I do not believe this. In the first place, it would be contrary to the character of the sovereign and his own words, and secondly its object could not easily be understood. Russia cannot intend to conquer any Prussian provinces, nor, I believe, any Austrian provinces. Russia has, I believe, as many Polish subjects as it cares to have, and has no desire to increase their numbers. To annex anything but Polish districts from Austria would be even more difficult. No reason exists, no pretence which could induce a European monarch suddenly to assail his neighbors. I even go so far in my confidence as to be convinced that a Russian war would not ensue if we should become involved in a French war because of some explo-

sive happenings in France, which no one can foresee and which surely are not intended by the present French Government. A French war, on the other hand, would be an absolute certainty if we should be involved in a Russian war, for no French Government would be so strong that it could prevent it, even if it was inclined to do so. But as regards Russia I still declare that I am not looking for an attack; and I take back nothing from what I said last year.

You will ask: "If that is so, what is the use of this expensive allocation of the Russian troops?" That is one of the questions for which one hardly can expect an answer from a ministry of foreign affairs, itself vitally interested. If we should begin to ask for explanations, we might receive forced replies, and our surrejoinders would also have to be forced. That is a dangerous path which I do not like to tread. Allocations of troops are things for which one does not take the other country to task, asking for categorical explanations, but against which one takes counter precautions with equal reserve and circumspection.

I cannot, therefore, give an authentic declaration concerning the motives of this Russian allocation, but, having been familiar through a generation with foreign politics and the policy of Russia, I can form my own ideas concerning them. These ideas lead me to assume that the Russian cabinet is convinced, probably with good reason, that the weight of the Russian voice in the diplomatic Areopagos of Europe will be the weightier in the next European crisis, the

stronger Russia is on the European frontier and the farther west the Russian armies stand. Russia is the more quickly at hand, either as an ally or as a foe, the nearer her main army, or at least a large army, is to her western frontier.

This policy has directed the Russian allocation of troops for a long while. You will remember that the army assembled in the Polish kingdom during the Crimean War was so large that this war might have ended differently if the army had started on time. If you think farther back, you will see that the events of 1830 found Russia unprepared and not ready to take a hand, because she had an insufficient number of troops in the western part of her empire. I need not, therefore, draw the conclusion from the accumulation of Russian troops in the western provinces (*sapadnii Gubernii*, as the Russians say), that our neighbors mean to attack us. I assume they are waiting, possibly for another Oriental crisis, intending then to be in the position of pressing home the Russian wishes by means of an army situated not exactly in Kasan, but farther west.

When may such an Oriental crisis take place, you ask. Forsooth, we have no certainty. During this century we have had, I think, four crises, if I do not include the smaller ones and those which did not culminate. One was in 1809 and ended with the treaty which gave Russia the Pruth-frontier, and another in 1828. Then there was the Crimean War of 1854, and the war of 1877. They have happened, therefore, at intervals of about twenty years and over. Why, then, should the next crisis take place sooner than after

a similar interval, or at about 1899, twenty years after the last one? I for one should like to reckon with the possibility of its being postponed and not occurring immediately.

Then there are other European events which are wont to take place at even intervals, the Polish uprisings, for instance. Formerly we had to expect one every eighteen or twenty years. Possibly this is one reason why Russia wishes to be so strong in Poland, that she may prevent them. Then there are the changes of government in France which also used to happen every eighteen or twenty years; and no one can deny that a change of government in France may bring about such a crisis that every interested nation may wish to be able to intervene with her full might—I mean only diplomatically, but with a diplomacy which is backed by an efficient army close at hand.

I assume on the strength of my purely technical-diplomatic judgment, which is based on my experience, that these are the intentions of Russia and that she has no wish to comply with the somewhat uncouth threats and boastings of the newspapers. And, if this is so, then there is surely no reason why we should look more gloomily into the future now than we have done at any time during the past forty years. The Oriental crisis is undoubtedly the most likely to occur, and in this our interests are only secondary. When it happens, we are in a position to watch whether the powers, who are primarily interested in the Mediterranean and the Levant, will make their decisions and come to terms, if

they choose, or go to war with Russia about them. We are not immediately called upon to do either. Every great power which is trying to influence or to restrain the policies of other countries in matters which are beyond the sphere of its interests is playing politics beyond the bounds which God has assigned to it. Its policy is one of force and not of vital interests. It is working for prestige. We shall not do this. If Oriental crises happen, we shall wait before taking our position until the powers who have greater interests at stake than we, have declared themselves.

There is, therefore, no reason, gentlemen, why you should look upon our present situation with unusual gravity, assuming this to be the cause of our asking for the mighty increase of our armaments which the military bill contemplates. I should like to separate the question of reëstablishing the *Landwehr* of the second grade, in short the big military bill and the financial bill, from the question of our present situation. It has to do, not with a temporary and transient arrangement, but with the permanent invigoration of the German Empire.

That no temporary arrangement is contemplated will be perfectly clear, I believe, when I ask you to survey with me the dangers of war which we have met in the past forty years without having become nervously excited at any one time.

In the year 1848, when many dikes and flood gates were broken, which until then had directed the peaceful flow of countless waters, we had to dispose of two questions freighted with the dan-

ger of war. They concerned Poland and Schleswig-Holstein. The first shouts after the Martial days were: War with Russia for the rehabilitation of Poland! Soon thereafter the danger was perilously near of being involved in a great European war on account of Schleswig-Holstein. I need not emphasize how the agreement of Olmütz, in 1850, prevented a great conflagration — a war on a gigantic scale. Then there followed two years of greater quiet but of general ill feeling, at the time when I first was ambassador in Frankfort. In 1853 the earliest symptoms of the Crimean War made themselves felt. This war lasted from 1853 to 1856, and during this whole time we were near the edge of the cliff, I will not say the abyss, whence it was intended to draw us into the war. I remember that I was obliged at that time, from 1853 to 1855, to alternate like a pendulum, so to speak, between Frankfort and Berlin, because the late king, thanks to the confidence he had in me, used me as the real advocate of his independent policy whenever the insistence of the western powers that we too should declare war on Russia grew too strong, and the opposition of his cabinet too flabby for his liking. Then the play was staged — I do not know how often — when I was called back here and ordered to write for His Majesty a more pro-Russian dispatch, and Mr. von Manteuffel resigned, and I requested to be instructed by His Majesty to follow Mr. von Manteuffel, after the dispatch was gone, into the country or anywhere else, and to induce him to resume his office. Yet each time Prussia was hovering on

the brink of a great war. It was exposed to the hostility of the whole of Europe, except Russia, if it refused to join in the policies of the west European powers, and, if it did, it was forced to break with Russia, possibly for a very long while, because the defection of Prussia would probably have been felt very painfully in Russia.

During the Crimean War, therefore, we were in constant danger of war. The war lasted till 1856, when it was at last concluded by the Treaty of Paris, and we found, in the Congress of Paris, a sort of Canossa prepared for us, for which I should not have assumed the responsibility, and against which I vainly counseled at the time. We were not at all obliged to play the part of a greater power than we were, and to sign the treaties made there. But we were dancing attendance with the view of being permitted to sign the treaty. This will not again happen to us.

That was in 1856, and in 1857 the problem of Neuchâtel was again threatening war. This did not become generally known. In the spring of that year I was sent to Paris by the late king to negotiate with Emperor Napoleon concerning the passage of Prussian troops in an attack upon Switzerland. Everyone who hears this from me will know what this would have meant in case of an understanding, and that it could have become a far-reaching danger of war, and might have involved us with France as well as with other powers. Emperor Napoleon was not unwilling to agree. My negotiations in Paris, however, were terminated because His Majesty the King in the meanwhile had come to an amicable under-

standing in the matter with Austria and Switzerland. But the danger of war, we must agree, was present also during that year.

While I was on this mission in Paris, the Italian War hung in the air. It broke out a little more than a year later and came very near drawing us into a big general war of Europe. We went so far as to mobilize, and we should undoubtedly have taken the field, if the Peace of Villafranca had not been concluded, somewhat prematurely for Austria, but just in time for ourselves, for we should have been obliged to wage this war under unfavorable circumstances. We should have turned this war, which was an Italian affair, into a Franco-Prussian war, and its cessation, outcome, and treaty of peace would no longer have depended on us, but on the friends and enemies who stood behind us.

Thus we came into the sixties without the clouds of war having cleared from the horizon for even one single year.

Already in 1863 another war threatened hardly less ominously, of which the people at large knew little, and which will only be appreciated when the secret archives of the cabinets will be made public. You may remember the Polish uprising of 1863, and I shall never forget the morning calls which I used to receive at that time from Sir Andrew Buchanan, the English ambassador, and Talleyrand, the French representative, who tried to frighten me out of my wits by attacking the Prussian policy for its inexcusable adherence to Russia, and who used rather a threatening language with me. At noon

I then used to have the pleasure of listening in the Prussian diet to somewhat the same arguments and attacks which the foreign ambassadors had made upon me in the morning. I suffered it quietly, but Emperor Alexander lost his patience, and wished to draw his sword against the plotting of the western powers. You will remember that the French forces were then engaged with American projects and in Mexico, which prevented France from taking a vigorous stand. The Emperor of Russia was no longer willing to stand the Polish intrigues of the other powers, and was ready to face events in our company and to go to war. You will remember that Prussia was struggling at that time with difficult interior problems, and that in Germany the leaven had begun to work in the minds of the people, and the council of the princes in Frankfurt was under contemplation. It may be readily granted, therefore, that the temptation for my gracious master was very strong to cut, and thus to heal, his difficult position at home by agreeing to a military undertaking on a colossal scale.

At that time war of Prussia and Russia together against those who were protecting the Polish insurrection against us would undoubtedly have taken place if His Majesty had not recoiled from the thought of solving home difficulties, Prussian as well as German, with foreign help. We declined in silence, and without revealing to the other German powers who had hostile projects against us the reasons which had determined our course. The subsequent death of the King of Denmark changed the trend of thought

of everybody interested. But all that was needed to bring about the great coalition war in 1863 was a "Yes" instead of a "No" from His Majesty the King in Gastein. Anybody but a German minister would perhaps have counseled affirmatively, from reasons of utility and opportunism in order to solve thereby our home difficulties. You see neither our own people nor foreigners really have a proper appreciation of the amount of national loyalty and high principles which guides both the sovereign and his ministers in the government of German States.

The year 1864—we just spoke of 1863—brought a new pressing danger of war. From the moment when our troops crossed the Eider, I was ready each week to see the European Council of Elders interfere in this Danish affair, and you will agree with me that this was highly probable.

In 1865 it faced about, and the preparations for the war of 1866 were beginning. In 1866, however, the war broke out in full force, as you know. A circumspect use of events alone enabled us to ward off the existing danger of turning this duel between Prussia and Austria into a fierce European war of coalition, when our very existence, our life and all we had, would have been at stake.

This was in 1866, and in 1867 the Luxembourg problem arose, when only a somewhat firmer reply was needed to bring about the great French war in that year,—and we might have given it, if we had been so strong that we could have counted on success. From then on, during

1868, 1869, and up to 1870 we were living in constant apprehension of war, and of the agreements which in the time of Mr. von Beust were being made in Salzburg and other places between France, Italy, and Austria, and which, we feared, were directed against us. The apprehension of war was so great at that time that I received calls—I was the president of the cabinet—from merchants and manufacturers, who said: “The uncertainty is unbearable. Why don’t you strike the first blow? War is preferable to this continued damper on all business!” We waited quietly until we were struck, and I believe we did well to arrange matters so that we were the nation which was assailed and were not ourselves the assailants.

Now, since the great war of 1870 was waged, has there been a year, I ask you, without the danger of war? In the first years of the seventies—the very moment we came home, the question arose: “When will be the next war? When will revenge be given? Within five years at the latest, no doubt?” We were told: “The question whether we shall have to fight and with what success surely rests with Russia now-a-days. Russia alone holds the hilt.” It was a representative of the Catholic party who thus remonstrated with me in the Reichstag. But I wish to complete the picture of the forty years by saying that in 1876 the clouds of war again began to gather in the south. In 1877 the Balkan War was waged, which would have led to a conflagration of the whole of Europe, if this had not been prevented by the Congress gathered

in Berlin. After the Congress an entirely new eastern picture presented itself to us, for Russia was offended by our attitude in the Congress.

Then there followed a period when we felt the results of the intimate relations of the three emperors, which for some time permitted us to face the future with greater placidity. But at the first symptoms of any instability in the relations of the three emperors or of the termination of the agreements which they had made with one another, public opinion was possessed of the same nervous and, I believe, exaggerated excitement with which we have had to contend these last years, and which I consider especially uncalled for today.

From my belief that this excitement is uncalled for I am far from drawing the conclusion that we do not need an increase in our armaments. The very opposite is my view, and this may explain the tableau of forty years which I have just exhibited before you.

Great complications and all kinds of coalitions, which no one can foresee, are constantly possible, and we must be prepared for them. We must be so strong, irrespective of momentary conditions, that we can face any coalition with the assurance of a great nation which is strong enough under circumstances to take her fate into her own hands. We must be able to face our fate placidly with that self-reliance and confidence in God which are ours when we are strong and our cause is just. And the Government will see to it that the German cause will be just always.

We must, to put it briefly, be as strong in these times as we possibly can be, and we can be stronger than any other nation of equal numbers in the world. I shall revert to this later — but it would be criminal if we were not to make use of our opportunity. If we do not need our full armed strength, we need not summon it. The only problem is the not very weighty one of money — not very weighty I say in passing, because I have no wish to enter upon a discussion of the financial and military figures, and of the fact that France has spent three milliards for the improvement of her armaments these last years, while we have spent scarcely one and one half milliards, including what we are asking of you at this time. But I leave the elucidation of this to the minister of war and the representatives of the treasury department.

When I say that it is our duty to endeavor to be ready at all times and for all emergencies, I imply that we must make greater exertions than other people for the same purpose, because of our geographical position. We are situated in the heart of Europe, and have at least three fronts open to an attack. France has only her eastern, and Russia only her western frontier where they may be attacked. We are also more exposed to the dangers of a coalition than any other nation, as is proved by the whole development of history, by our geographical position, and the lesser degree of cohesiveness, which until now has characterized the German nation in comparison with others. God has placed us where we are prevented, thanks to our neighbors,

from growing lazy and dull. He has placed by our side the most warlike and restless of all nations, the French, and He has permitted warlike inclinations to grow strong in Russia, where formerly they existed to a lesser degree. Thus we are given a spur, so to speak, from both sides, and are compelled to exertions which we should perhaps not be making otherwise. The pikes in the European carp-pond are keeping us from being carps by making us feel their teeth on both sides. They also are forcing us to an exertion which without them we might not make, and to a union among us Germans, which is abhorrent to us at heart. By nature we are rather tending away, the one from the other. But the Franco-Russian press within which we are squeezed compels us to hold together, and by pressure our cohesive force is greatly increased. This will bring us to that state of being inseparable which all other nations possess, while we do not yet enjoy it. But we must respond to the intentions of Providence by making ourselves so strong that the pikes can do nothing but encourage us.

Formerly in the years of the Holy Alliance — I am just thinking of an American song which I learned of my late friend Motley: “In good old colonial times, when we lived under a King” — well, those were the good old patriarchal times when we had many posts to guide us, and many dikes to protect us from the wild floods of Europe. There were the German Union, and the real support and consummation of the German Union, the Holy Alliance. We had support in

Russia and in Austria, and, above all, the guaranty of our diffidence never permitted us to express an opinion before the others had spoken.

All this we have lost; we must help ourselves. The Holy Alliance was wrecked in the Crimean War — not through our fault. The German Union has been destroyed by us, because the existence which we were granted within it was unbearable in the long run for ourselves and the German people as well. After the dissolution of the German Union and the war of 1866, Prussia, as it was then, or North Germany, would have become isolated, if we had been obliged to count with the fact that nobody would be willing to pardon our new successes — the great successes which we had won. No great power looks with favor on the successes of its neighbors.

To sum up: I do not believe in an immediate interruption of peace, and I ask you to discuss this bill independently of such a thought or apprehension, looking upon it as a means of making the great strength which God has placed in the German nation fully available. If we do not need all the troops, it is not necessary to summon them. We are trying to avoid the contingency when we shall need them.

This attempt is as yet made rather difficult for us by the threatening newspaper articles in the foreign press, and I should like to admonish these foreign editors to discontinue such threats. They do not lead anywhere. The threats which we see made — not by the governments, but by the press — are really incredibly stupid, when

we stop to reflect that the people making them imagine they could frighten the proud and powerful German empire by certain intimidating figures made by printer's ink and shallow words. People should not do this. It would then be easier for us to be more obliging to our two neighbors. Every country after all is sooner or later responsible for the windows which its press has smashed. The bill will be rendered some day, and will consist of the ill-feeling of the other country. We are easily influenced — perhaps too easily — by love and kindness, but quite surely never by threats! We Germans fear God, and naught else in the world! It is this fear of God which makes us love and cherish peace. If in spite of this anybody breaks the peace, he will discover that the ardent patriotism of 1813, which called to the standards the entire population of Prussia — weak, small, and drained to the marrow as it then was — has today become the common property of the whole German nation. Attack the German nation anywhere, and you will find it armed to a man, and every man with the firm belief in his heart: God will be with us.

CHAPTER VIII

GERMANY AND ENGLAND

Two years ago Paul Rohrbach¹ addressed to the Germans a powerful plea for a more purposeful realization of their moral responsibilities as a world power. He showed them their past, pointed to the defects of their character, to their problems at home and abroad, and closed with an impassioned appeal that they drop from their train of thoughts and actions every petty notion, and be worthy of the material greatness they had achieved. In this world, he said, only moral questions count, and nobody can long maintain a position of importance unless moral forces issue from him for the benefit of mankind.

Rohrbach's whole book is a book of peace and moral justice. He is, therefore, the last man to misrepresent wilfully England's attitude toward Germany; and what he said to his countrymen two years ago may well be quoted as having shaped the opinions of the most thought-

¹Paul Rohrbach. *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*, published by Karl Robert Langewiesche, Düsseldorf, 1912.

ful, especially since his book was sold by the tens of thousands.

It may be doubted whether the many threatening remarks from English statesmen and publicists quoted by Dr. Rohrbach should have been taken by him at their face value. He, however, believed that they expressed the temper of the British people, and the British attitude since the war would seem to bear him out. In war time, however, passions are high, and people repeat, from a sense of patriotism, what they do not really believe. When people realize that they have given their opponents reasonable cause for suspicion, the foundations for an amicable understanding are quickly found. Herein lies the hope of the cessation of the British-German bitterness. If Germany could feel sure that Great Britain did not wish to destroy her commerce, and if Great Britain felt that Germany had no desire of attacking her, the two nations, who are each other's best customers, would no longer wish to wage a war to the death.

Great Britain also should realize that, however sincere she is in her claim that she went to war as the protector of neutral Belgium, there are incidents in her career which justify an opponent in doubting this. British men and women have done much to advance the civilization of the world and may perhaps justly claim that the

present state of British morality in dealing with other nations is such that it is unfair to judge Great Britain by what she did years ago. The political memory of nations, however, is long, and Germany has not forgotten that only about a hundred years ago the British fleet appeared before Copenhagen and bombarded the open city, destroying, among other buildings, the finest church of Denmark. Denmark was then a neutral country during the war between Great Britain and Napoleon. Great Britain did not respect her neutrality, but after her successful bombardment carried off the Danish fleet as a prize. She did the same thing in 1807 with the island of Madeira, which she kept in her possession until 1814; and in both cases her excuse was that she wished to anticipate a possible invasion of these countries by Napoleon.

In view of such comparatively recent events, she should at least acknowledge the reasonableness of her opponent's suspicion, and try to allay it rather than to fan it by the inflammatory speeches of some of her statesmen.

In quoting the following extract of the sixth chapter of Dr. Rohrbach's book, the attempt is made of showing that it was easy for Germany to believe that Great Britain was planning her destruction: ¹

¹ Compare, however, above with Chapter V.

It is so important for us to understand the gradual development of the English animosity against us, and without this so impossible to understand the workings of present-day politics that we must discuss this subject at some length before we can indicate a proper course of action. If one looks for a date after which our relations with England grew strained, the year 1890 occurs to one, when England ceded to us the island of Heligoland in return for considerable concessions in Africa. The cession of Heligoland clearly proves that at that time nobody in England believed that the German navy could ever grow strong enough to be dangerous to England's supremacy on the sea. It is true that the English merchants had already begun to complain of German competition. In 1887 the English law was passed that goods not manufactured in England should be so marked. It was aimed against Germany, but the legend "Made in Germany" had soon a different meaning from the one the law makers had expected it would have. But whenever the German fleet was discussed in England it was in the sense of the remarks which Lord Palmerston addressed to the Germans through his press in 1861, when the Schleswig-Holstein question became acute; plow your fields, sail with your clouds, build your castles in Spain, for you have never had the genius of crossing the oceans or sailing the seas or even your inland waters!

What would not England give today if she could annul her cession of Heligoland to Germany! Did our government desire the posses-

sion of Heligoland as long ago as the time when the Zanzibar treaty was made, because our responsible statesmen foresaw our future development? One would be glad to answer this question with yes. But as a matter of fact the purchase of Heligoland had been more than once suggested to England, but without avail, by Bismarck himself during the preceding decades. The realization, however, of the economic changes in Germany and its consequently altered political status, did not come either to ourselves or to the English people earlier than during the decade intervening between the Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty of 1890 and the navy law of 1900. When the plans for our navy were proposed and the reasons for its increase developed before the people, public opinion was generally able to follow the discussion. The greatest credit for having instructed the nation on the transoceanic matters vitally affecting its interests belongs to the navy department. The material which this department placed before the people in pamphlets, lectures, newspaper articles, books, and, finally, in the discussions in parliament, represents one of the grandest forces of instruction ever wielded in any cause. Neither before nor after the introduction of the navy law by Admiral von Tirpitz has there been as close a touch between the government and the people as existed at that time. The review of the huge figures, which represented the growth of our interests abroad, was very impressive, and the necessity of protecting them with a large fleet was conclusively proved.

Everything that is familiar to us today: the danger for Germany of a naval blockade, the destruction of our home-commerce if one deprives us of our foreign markets, all this was then for the first time elucidated—and how much smaller were those figures and values twelve years ago than they are today.

The notion that we can continue to live content with defending and keeping what we have already attained, gave place, at least in the case of the intelligent people, to the conviction that Germany would face a decision concerning its future of even greater moment than it had been called upon to meet during the periods of reconstruction from Königgrätz to Versailles. People saw visions of a Germany still more firmly rooted in the commerce of the world, and drawing from it its sustenance in increased measure; a Germany which one day would be met by England in her panoply with the threat: I bid you stop! that I may take my place!

In England people like to ignore the possibility of Germany's commerce growing to menacing proportions. For this reason, we are told, a big navy is superfluous for Germany unless she intends to fight England with it. If Germany had no other intentions than to protect her commerce with her fleet, then the expenses which it incurred for her fleet were altogether unnecessary, because nobody, and England least of all, was thinking of endangering the German trade. The first lord of the admiralty, Winston Churchill, referred to the English and German navies in a speech in Glasgow on February 9,

1912, as follows: "We have no thoughts and we have never had any thoughts of aggression — and we attribute no such thoughts to other Great Powers. There is, however, this difference between the British naval power, and the naval power of the great and friendly Empire of Germany. The British Navy is to us a necessity, and from some points of view the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval power involves British existence. It is existence to us, it is expansion to them. We cannot menace the peace of a single continental hamlet nor do we wish to do so no matter how great and supreme our Navy may become. But on the other hand, the whole fortunes of our race and Empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement would perish and be swept away if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It is the British Navy which makes Great Britain a Great Power. But Germany was a Great Power, respected and honored all over the world before she had a single ship. Those facts ought to be clearly stated because there is no doubt that there is a disposition in some quarters to suppose that Great Britain and Germany are on terms of equality so far as naval risks are concerned. Such a supposition is utterly untrue. The government is resolved to maintain the naval supremacy which this country enjoys." Thus spoke the English present first lord of the admiralty. But once there was another leader of the English navy, George Monck, Duke of Albemarle, Cromwell's lieutenant

against Holland. When it seemed desirable to hunt up another reason or excuse for an attack on Holland, Monck said: "What does this or that reason matter? What we need is a slice of the commerce which the Dutch now have."

A few years later Charles II wrote to Louis XIV, when the two nations were contemplating an alliance against Holland, that there were some serious obstacles to an agreement, the chief of which were "the present great pains of France to create commerce and to be a naval power of consequence. This is for us, who can be great only by our commerce and our navy, so serious a cause of suspicion, that every step which France is taking in this direction, of necessity must rekindle the jealousies of the two nations." A century later, when the seven years' naval war between England and France was ended, Pitt, the English minister, said that France was especially dangerous to England as a naval and commercial power and that the chief English successes were the damage done to France along these lines. He also added his regrets that France had been given the opportunity of rebuilding her navy.

In view of these historical witnesses concerning the real views of English statesmen, kings, and admirals as regards nations who claim an important share of the commerce of the world, and the right to protect it with their own navy, would it not be somewhat risky, if we placed entire confidence in the assurances coming from England today that we could rely even without a fleet on the pacific intentions of England and

be assured of a safe competition in the commerce of the world? All due respect to Mr. Churchill's word as the expression of his personal opinion! But all too often a different tune has sounded from England, emanating, moreover, from the highest quarters. Who finally can guarantee that the other political party which at present is not guiding the destinies of the country, will not sing a different tune when it comes to power? Even the present Liberal Lord of the admiralty will hardly look upon the campaign speeches of the leader of the Conservatives during the recent campaign on the "German danger" as calculated to quiet Germany.

On the contrary, the true attitude of England toward our navy and commerce is revealed by such comments as were contained in the famous article in the *Saturday Review* of September, 1897, which made a great stir in England and the whole world, and frankly stated that England's prosperity could only be saved if Germany were destroyed. "England," the article says in part, "with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvelous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but perhaps with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, in the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever — and where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible,

and trade has followed the flag, there the German bagman is struggling with the English pedlar. Is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman are struggling to be first. A million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. *If Germany were extinguished tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be richer.* Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession. Must they not fight for two hundred million pounds of commerce?"

The article then goes on to say that a most tangible conflict of interests existed between England and Germany, and that England, moreover, was the only great power which could make war on Germany without running an enormous risk, and even with an undoubted prospect of success. "Her partners in the Triple Alliance would be useless against England; Austria because she could do nothing; Italy because she dare not lay herself open to an attack by France. The growth of Germany's fleet has done no more than to make the blow of England fall on her more heavily. A few days, and the ships would be at the bottom, or in convoy to English ports; Hamburg and Bremen, the Kiel Canal and the Baltic ports would lie under the guns of England, waiting until the indemnity were settled. Our work over, we need not even be at the pains to alter Bismarck's words to Ferry and to say to France

and Russia, 'Seek some compensation. Take inside Germany whatever you like. You can have it.' "

Germaniam esse delendam!

Down with Germany!

Thus the article concludes, and we know very well that it does not reflect the feelings of the whole of England, but nevertheless of a considerable portion of the English nation.

A few years ago a former colleague of Winston Churchill, Mr. Arthur Lee, civil lord of the admiralty, that is to say, an active member of the English government, expressed himself even more clearly when he said in a public speech on February 3, 1905, that the center of the naval power in Europe had shifted, and that England would have to look with care, although not with anxiety, to the North Sea rather than to the Mediterranean. If the English navy should be thus redistributed and war should come, then England could strike the first blow before the other party had time to read in the newspapers that war had been declared.

Late in the fall of 1904 after the misunderstanding near the Doggerbank between the Russian fleet on its way to Asia and the fishermen from Hull, the opinion was expressed in England that Germany had warned Russia of a possible attack by Japanese torpedo boats, and at the same time had placed her own ships in readiness against England. In this connection the semi-official *Army and Navy Gazette* remarked that it was intolerable that England should be forced solely by the existence of the German

fleet to take precautions which otherwise would not be necessary. "Before now we have had to wipe out of existence a fleet which we had reason to believe might be used as a weapon to our hurt. There are not wanting those both in this country and on the Continent who regard the German fleet as the one and only menace to the preservation of peace in Europe. This may or may not be the case. We are content to point out that the present moment is particularly opportune for asking that this fleet should not be further increased." One of the most influential English papers, the *Daily Chronicle*, referred to this proposal and the speech of the lord of the admiralty, Mr. Lee, by saying that we should have peace in Europe for sixty years if the German navy had been destroyed in October, 1904; and that the words of Mr. Lee — provided they had the sanction of the cabinet — were wise, for they contained a pacific declaration of the immutable intentions of the mistress of the sea.

Such depositions do not well agree with the assertion of Mr. Churchill that England neither had nor ever had had aggressive intentions against Germany. And what does he mean by England? Is it the responsible office holders of the party which happens to have the majority in parliament? Or the sum-total of the English nation? Or the preponderating part of public opinion in England? These are all forces which may change, under certain conditions, more speedily than anybody in Germany can foresee. If it is difficult, according to the well-known

dictum of Bismarck, to enter into a binding political contract with England, because the English constitution does not permit treaties of specified durations, it is even less possible to rely on the expressions of momentary opinions either by the press or even by persons in responsible positions. We all know that we were very near a war with England during the summer and early fall of 1911. We also know that on September 18, 1911, the English fleet in the North Sea and the canal was ready for action, that a simultaneous attack against Kiautschou and our possessions in the South Sea was being prepared, and that negotiations with France were under way for her assistance in a war on land. We know that a year earlier English public opinion and policy had strenuously objected to the fortification of the mouth of the Schelde. Why? Because this would have lessened the opportunity of sending English troops through the Schelde to unite with the French army in a war on Germany. It is, therefore, impossible to submit, with tied hands, to the kind intentions of the English, and to leave to them the sole control of the seas. It is equally impossible to place one's trust in the one-sided assurances of English statesmen who say that they had not intended to attack us, when not only the quantity but also the weight of contrary English statements compel us to believe that the denial in this case is probably only intended to be an excuse and is meant for the less informed general public.

Ever since 1897, when the first solitary cries

for a war with Germany gradually began to swell into a mighty chorus, down to the mobilization and negotiation with France in 1911, there have been many orators who have uttered the famous word of Cato against Carthage in its appropriate variation: *Ceterum censeo, Germaniam esse delendam* (For the rest I hold that Germany must be destroyed). "If the German fleet were destroyed, the peace of Europe would be secure for two generations. England and France, or England and the United States, or all three would vouch for the freedom of the sea, and prevent the construction of new ships, which are dangerous weapons in the hands of ambitious powers with a growing population and without colonies." These words from an influential English organ in the critical fall of 1904, after the Russian mistake in the North Sea, represent the true feeling of a considerable part of English public opinion. They deserve our attention fully as much as the pacific utterances of individuals. It is not our intention to impugn the sincerity and the honest desire of those English friends of peace, who like ourselves are striving to avoid an armed encounter of the two nations, but not one of these estimable gentlemen can guarantee to us that in the decisive moment his voice will win over that of the anti-German party which is resolved to secure the welfare of England according to the principles of Admiral Monck, William Pitt, Palmerston or the lord of the admiralty Mr. Arthur Lee. Where were the advocates of peace, when in September, 1911, the English

battleships and cruisers and torpedo boats and submarines lay at anchor waiting the order to steam forth into the North Sea to attack the naval power, the shore fortifications and the commercial cities of Germany? Who can know what motives in the last minute were counseling peace? Nobody in Germany knew of the danger which was threatening us, and it is unlikely that in England the war party made confidants of the advocates of peace, the Anglican Church dignitaries, or the men who are working for a peaceful understanding with Germany, and who are reproaching us now for our suspicion.

When the first insignificant attempts were made in Germany to create a navy, and a certain grudge began to stir in England, Prince Bismarck declared in the Reichstag, January 10, 1885: "It is not surprising that England in her consciousness that 'Britannia rules the waves' looks up with wonder at seeing her landlubber cousins — for thus she thinks of us — suddenly go to sea. The highest influential circles of England, however, do not share this feeling, and find it difficult to moderate in time the expression of this surprise in their subjects." No German chancellor today could speak thus of the relation between the influential and the non-influential circles in England.

We do not take it at all amiss that England's pride and consciousness of mastery revolts at the imputation that she should hereafter recognize the interests of another nation as equal to her own, not only in Europe but also in the trans-

oceanic world. Nobody in the world has the right to blame a great and sovereign nation if it prefers, under these conditions, to fight rather than to submit. It is true, as Mr. Churchill said, that all possessions of the English race are endangered as soon as her power on the seas is at stake. But we can reply with exactly the same right: Not only our goods and wealth, but also our national existence and the future of our national idea in the world are at stake, when our defences by land and by sea are insufficient to make our opponents look on an attack upon us as too great a risk. It does not occur to us to deny the superiority of the English fleet, and if the English people wish very much to use the word supremacy rather than superiority, they are welcome to do so. But when they interpret their "supremacy" to mean that our interests shall yield to theirs everywhere in the world they will compel us to fight with them for our future, that is to say, our national existence. If they wish to prescribe to us how far we may go in the world to spread our ideas, we should be fools and cowards if we were to acknowledge this foreign command as binding without recourse to arms.

If fate has decreed that we shall not reach our goal of being a world nation, then this decision should not rest with the proclamation of English supremacy but with the thundering voice of the guns. *No greater harm can come to us if we are conquered by the English than if we voluntarily renounce our claim of equality with them.*

The same necessity which drove England along the road of naval development has determined our course. We have seen how every year a larger part of our population has been dependent for its daily bread on a growing share in the markets of the world. Germany must be able to stand the competition of all the other nations, notably England, and it has shown its ability to do so. The nation which possessed not only a superior navy but one so absolutely the master of our own that it could influence our policy by the mere threat of a naval war, would have a tremendous power over us. The more we come to be a people which lives by its share in the markets of the world, the more we must take care that we are not suddenly pressed aside or driven away from it by a stronger nation.

In spite of this, good relations between Germany and England are not impossible, and should, therefore, be eagerly sought. They are more desirable for us and for them than anything else. They can, however, only be achieved on the basis of a formal and absolute equality. This means that the vital interests of one nation must be respected by the other. The American secretary of the navy, Mr. Morton, stated on November 18, 1904, that he was in favor of a fleet which was so strong that no other nation would dare to risk an encounter with it. According to his opinion the American navy should be inferior to none. Half a year later President Roosevelt declared that a first class fleet capable of meeting any hostile combination was the best

and cheapest guaranty of peace; and that the person who had not noticed this in the history of all the people in recent years must be blind. Even more concise was the question, asked by an American writer on naval matters, Commodore Fisk, in his book on the American naval policy (1905): "Why should a country like England, which is not larger than the United States, have need of the larger navy?" No such word has ever been uttered from our side concerning the relation of the German navy to that of England.

The English people say, to be sure, that it was we and not the Americans who wished to attack them. This assertion can be caused by only two motives, either conscious hypocrisy, hunting for an excuse to attack us with a semblance of right, or insufficient political deliberation. The latter is probably the weightier cause. Either, we attack England and are beaten, then a national catastrophe is staring us in the face, or, the highly improbable and inconceivable happens, and we actually conquer the English fleet, although ours is only half as big, and are proceeding to force on England a disadvantageous peace. At that moment an European coalition against us is with absolute certainty an accomplished fact, destined to deprive us of the prize of victory. Not only France and Russia, but also our ally Austria-Hungary together with Italy and all the minor States could do nothing less than to unite against us as soon as a decisive German victory over England was impending, and before we assumed the dictatorship of Eu-

rope. They would have to do it for the sake of their own future.

To understand this, one needs only an elementary political knowledge. If England nevertheless makes official use of the notion that Germany might attack her, we may forgive the man on the street and the sensational press their ignorance of the political ABC. But if politicians of note and statesmen who are guiding the affairs of the nation, or after a change of parliamentary majorities may be called to such offices, express such ideas, they must not be astonished if we begin to suspect that England is not so much afraid of an attack by us, as that she desires to make preparations for an attack on us.

No German politician or statesman, no German paper or intelligent man in Germany has ever hinted or expressed the thought that we should build as large a navy as the English or even as large as that part of the English navy which is kept in home waters. What we need, and what we must have at all hazards, with or without the good will of England, is a navy strong enough to endanger England's superior position on the sea, if she should attack us, even if the immediate outcome should be advantageous to her. We must have so many ships that the losses which England will sustain in putting us down will deprive her of her naval superiority over the other intact navies of the world. No English policy can risk this. Let the English build as many ships as they think necessary for their safety but let them count with this fact

once and for all, that we shall say: We do not care how many ships you build, we shall and must build so many that it will be too dangerous for you to run the risk of an attack on us. From the German point of view this is so clearly a defensive policy that it is altogether impossible to impute to it aggressive tendencies. It gives to England what is hers and cedes to Germany her own. If the English are not content, preferring to maintain their absolute "supremacy" even for an attack, they show that they will not acknowledge our political and national equality in the world. But then it is they, and not we, who are constantly turning the screw of increased armaments. Financially we shall be able for a long while yet to raise the means for battleships, cruisers, and whatever else is necessary for a naval war. The sacrifices which Prussia and other States and people have made in critical times are an entirely different thing from the taxes which even in an extreme case may be required of us. If, nevertheless, the day should come when not our financial ability but our national readiness to make sacrifices gives out, and the majority of the German people prefer to save money in its defences rather than to advance the German idea in the world, well, then we shall have deserved no better fate than that the English shoot us down and proclaim to the people of Europe: Help yourselves! Take your compensation from Germany wherever you wish!

We Germans know that nature herself compels us, whether or no we like it, to push the

roots and fibers of our economic life ever deeper into the world abroad. In doing this we are met by the suspicion, jealousy, hostility, and the special policies of other mighty people. If until now an outbreak of hostilities has been prevented, and often at the last moment, it is nowhere written that this will always be so. Under these conditions how can we justify any calculations as to how much less strong we should keep our defences, of our own free will? Is there any other reason than our strength why our opponents should spare us? *Will England, France, and Russia hesitate to use their superiority as soon as they think it is sufficient to worst us and our friends?* What shall keep them from it? Would the desired revenge for 1870 restrain the French? Or their anxiety over our commerce and navy restrain the English? Or would the Russians hesitate because of their antipathy against us, their anger at our faithful support of our ally, Austria-Hungary, or because they need a thorough reparation for their defeats in East Asia? The balance between desire and hesitation will be kept in the camp of our opponents only while we are strong. When we are no longer strong, or at least no longer seem to be so, then the others will be impelled as by an elemental force to remove from their midst an inconvenient nation. This is the true state of affairs, and yet there are patriotic Germans who deliberate whether it would not be better to save millions, and so risk thousands of millions and even the very future of the German idea in the world!

Everything that has been said thus far may be summed up by repeating, that as we are situated today nobody, no individual power nor probable combination of powers, can do us any harm except in conjunction with England. In saying this we assume that our alliance with Austria-Hungary will continue as firm as it has been in the past. The correctness of this assumption is based on the fact that the German-Austrian protection is mutual. We are easily a match for France alone, and a Franco-Russian combination will automatically put the Austro-Hungarian army into action. *Italy belongs nominally to the Triple Alliance, but it is better not to speculate on her movements, because her public opinion is uncertain, and her dynasty not sufficiently secure to be able to insist on carrying out a treaty in the face of a hostile public opinion.* From the present state of European politics, therefore, it follows of necessity that whoever harbors plans against Germany must seek an understanding with England. England, on the other hand, has systematically endeavored to gather into her camp whatever forces are inimical to our interests. If we are strong enough to keep England from attacking us by sea, then we need not trouble about anything else. The only means, however, of accomplishing this, is a strong navy. If it suffices to keep England at bay, this very fact secures the peace of Europe. We cannot and we must not deviate from this naval policy, which depends entirely on the English naval program. In this connection it was very fortunate for us that the

experiences of the naval encounters between Russia and Japan induced England to adopt the Dreadnought type of battleships. This type greatly depreciated all the older ships in any navy, and while it would have been a hopeless task for us, in the pre-Dreadnought period to catch up even in a remote way with the tremendous superiority of the English navy, the Dreadnoughts gave a new start on equal terms to all nations. To their misfortune, the English people thought that they would preserve the absolute superiority in the construction of huge modern battleships for a considerable length of time. But in this they were mistaken, for owing to the introduction of the Dreadnought type we have caught up with them in the last six years to an extent which formerly would have appeared to be a fantastic improbability. Our relation to them in Dreadnought strength is already slightly better than 1 : 2, and if the definitely adopted scheme of our naval construction did not happen to contemplate a decrease of new ships in the next few years, this proportion would for the present be maintained.

Our second factor of safety lies in fostering our good relations with Turkey. The financial and general economic strengthening of the Turkish Empire, the construction of railways, and, above everything else, a large, well armed, and ready Turkish army, these would weigh so distinctly in our favor, if our opponents should break the peace, that the progress of Turkey must be a subject of great interest for us. If our policy, nevertheless, was not able to keep

Italy from her attack on Tripolis and to obviate the consequent serious complications for Turkey in her affairs both at home and abroad, it shows unfortunately that a nominally allied power like Italy does not believe that German interests impose upon her any obligatory considerations.

Our present political situation is doubtless subject to the interpretation that we are no longer so respected as we were in Bismarck's time, and many people express their patriotic fear that we are no longer successful in anything. This much is correct, that our opponents at present are in a position to prescribe for us to a certain extent what we shall do, unless we should be willing to break all existing political knots by a great war. Such a war, however, would be so great a risk to what we have achieved and still may achieve that we cannot decide on it, unless the opposing parties plan something which will either infringe our honor or imperil our national existence — or by an attack on us will relieve us of the trouble of making a decision at all. If this does not happen, our only possible policy toward England and the powers in her train is to be always armed to the full extent of our ability, and to declare at the same time our inviolable readiness to have peace and a loyal understanding with our opponents, provided they will give us a pledge that such an understanding will be sincere and lasting.

CHAPTER IX

MILITARISM

GERMANY is often called the home of militarism; and in spite of her contributions to civilization many have taken sides against her in the Great War, because they believe that a defeat of the German army will prove to be a victory for anti-militarism, throughout the world. Germany's friends are convinced that this will not be the case, because Germany is not the home of militarism, either as regards the military spirit of her people, or the efforts of the government to have the most expensive military machinery at its disposal.

These facts are so contrary to the general understanding that one is hardly astonished to have their accuracy challenged. No conclusions can be drawn from the attitude of the people since the war, because ranks are always serried when foreign danger threatens, and the French and English are as determined as the Germans to defend their honor and their country. But before the war? Nobody who really knew the country then could have called the Germans

belligerent or eager for war. As has been said above, the Germans were commercially aggressive, branching out all over the world. They were building up one trade here, another there, and trying to win the confidence of the people everywhere. Some of the biggest enterprises were contemplating contracts to be made for a number of years, while others, such as the importation of metal ores from South America necessitated the investment of enormous sums in an ore-carrying fleet. Even the smaller enterprises had to reckon with a settled future, for a first assignment of goods is often attended by great expenditures of advertising and other overhead charges. Only after the channels of distribution have been prepared are profits assured. No nation, therefore, will enter on an aggressive commercial career, as long as it is determined to bring about a war for its own aggrandisement.

As regards Germany, it will probably not be denied that the majority of her people were following the peaceful paths of commerce and industry, and of agriculture, but it is believed that her army was so big, and had grown so strong that its warlike spirit prevailed and set at naught the wishes of the great majority. Anybody who will take the trouble of looking through the list of names of officers of the German army, and

will trace their family connections, will at once be faced by a fact which tends to disprove this theory. In many cases the great army leaders are brothers or fathers of the men who stand high in the commercial world. The writer knows of his own experience that one of the cavalry generals prominently mentioned in connection with the German right wing in the battle of the Aisne is the owner of one of the largest and oldest establishments, if not the oldest business, in the city of Danzig. The brother of this general was a farmer, and all his relatives on his mother's side are in business.

There is not such a thing in Germany as a military clique, out of sympathy with and opposed to the great masses of the people. Nor could there be, because the future lay bright before the Germans for just so long as they could retain peace. Those who doubt this assertion should ask themselves which European nation had been the undoubted gainer during the past forty years? In population Germany had grown to be fifty per cent. larger than the United Kingdom, and about seventy-five per cent. larger than France. In commerce it had advanced from almost the last place among the big nations to the second place, easily outstripping France and even forging ahead of the United States in bulk of imports and exports, although the United

States has a world monopoly in cotton. In rate of progress Germany excelled the United Kingdom at the ratio of more than two to one, according to the figures of the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* (London, July, 1914, pp. 788-789), for the German rate of increase from 1888 to 1912 was 204 per cent. while the rate of the United Kingdom was only 100.7 per cent. In recent years Germany took three steps in advance to every two taken by the United Kingdom. Another twenty years of honorable peace, and Germany would have stood in the first rank of the European nations, provided the rate of progress of the past decade could have been maintained.

These figures, or at least their substance, were well-known in Germany; and the intensity of a hopeful outlook on the future was comparable only to the richly pulsating life in the United States. Germany and America were the two countries of western civilization where interest and pride in a constantly changing present and the sure promise of an even richer future kept the people from being hypnotized by past grievances or imaginary wrongs. Great Britain rarely forgot her sorrow at seeing her absolute control of the markets of the world slip from her grasp, while France, whose population stood still, could not take her eyes from Strassburg and "re-

venge." "If one of our older generation," says Paul Rohrbach, "who was in France in 1870 or '71, revisits today the cities which he knew then, he stands aghast before the fact that time seems to have stood still there. The same houses and streets and squares, the same city confines as fifty years ago! In Germany, where there is an enormous increase of all large and fairly large cities, where there is a rapid development of all communications, and an extraordinary increase of the fortunes of men, we can hardly imagine such a state of affairs."

It is because the German people were so extraordinarily successful in peace that they had become forgetful, in the words of the much quoted General von Bernhardt — although these particular words are rarely quoted — forgetful of their military abilities and had become too peaceful for their own safety. It was not thus in France, where thoughts of a war with Germany made the hearts beat faster, and where, in spite of all assurances of peaceful intentions, an intense love of military prowess had survived. These were the strong emotions which gave stability to a not overstrong government and which consoled the country for the standstill to which its own small family and not-more-than-two-children average had condemned it.

Russia, of course, is a far more military State

than Germany, nor is it to be assumed that Germany's defeat would quench the military spirit of the newer States such as Servia, Bulgaria and Greece, not to mention Japan.

In so far, therefore, as the spirit of the people is concerned, Germany is surely not the home of militarism, especially not if militarism connotes the desire of attacking other people.

Militarism, however, has another meaning in the minds of people, for it may refer to the tremendous risk which lurks in the mere existence of a strong fighting machine. This risk, it is believed, is greatly increased when the constitution of the country where it is found, places the arbitrary control over it in the hands of one man. The German army, it is said, is the best army in the world, and the German Emperor has absolute control over it. He even has the right to declare war, if "an attack on the frontiers or the coast of the Empire has been made", although under all other circumstances he needs the consent of the Federation.

It may readily be agreed that this is a defect of the German constitution, and that nothing is gained thereby. In the present war the Emperor had not only the unanimous consent of the Council of the Federation (the Bundesrat) but also of the Reichstag. It is not generally known that the Emperor took no steps, from the moment the

situation began to look critical, except in consultation with the leaders of *all* the parties of the Reichstag, and with the governments of all the federated States. Nothing, therefore, would have been altered, if the constitution had made the declaration of war the duty of the elected representatives of the German people instead of entrusting it jointly to the Emperor and the Council of the Federated States. The German people, knowing William II, never doubted that this would be his course, while strangers, who knew only the wording of the constitution and were less familiar with the character of the Emperor and the temper of the German people, are excusable if they assumed that the Emperor acted with an arbitrariness for which the constitution seemed to offer an excuse.

As a matter of fact, it is unbelievable to any German that the Emperor, even if he were not as peace-loving as William II is, would commit them to a war against their wishes. This is as unbelievable to them as it would be to Americans that their president as commander-in-chief of the army and navy should wilfully direct the movements of the American forces so that war ensued against the wishes of the people.

This disposes, to a certain extent, of the danger to the peace of the world lurking in the German constitution, but it still leaves the oppor-

tunity for claiming that Germany is the home of militarism because she has the largest army in the world in proportion to her size.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the actual figures, and to see how much the several big nations of the world have been in the habit of paying for their "national defences." The complete figures of all the countries for the past two years are not yet available. They are larger in every instance than the latest figures given below. But since the actual increase in the German figures is less than the increase in the French and British, and especially the Russian figures, the argument of the present investigation will not be affected. To guard against any inaccuracy, the German figures are given as they were published in million marks, and to simplify the comparison the other figures are reduced to million marks. The approximate value of a mark is almost twenty-four cents, or for rough calculation one-fourth of a dollar.

1. Germany expended, —

	1902	1911
For the Army.....	670,000,000 marks	810,000,000 marks
For the Navy.....	205,000,000 "	450,000,000 "
Together.....	875,000,000 "	1,260,000,000 "

Figured per capita of the population this was in 1902 15 marks and in 1911 19 1-5 marks.

2. The United Kingdom expended, —

	1902	1911
For the Army.....	585,000,000 marks	547,000,000 marks
For the Navy.....	633,000,000 “	906,000,000 “
Together.....	1,218,000,000 “	1,453,000,000 “

Figured per capita of the population this was in 1902 29 marks and in 1911 32 marks, or about 60 per cent. more than Germany.

3. France expended, —

	1902	1911
For the Army.....	584,000,000 marks	718,000,000 marks
For the Navy.....	243,000,000 “	333,000,000 “
Together.....	827,000,000 “	1,051,000,000 “

Figured per capita of the population this was in 1902 21 marks, and in 1911 26 1-2 marks, or about 38 per cent. more than Germany.

4. The United States expended, —

	1902	1911
For the Army.....	511,000,000 marks	559,000,000 marks
For the Navy.....	349,000,000 “	535,000,000 “
Together.....	860,000,000 “	1,066,000,000 “

Figured per capita of the population this was in 1911 almost 12 marks, or only 62 1-2 per cent. of the German expenditures.

5. Russia expended, —

	1902	1911
For the Army.....	741,000,000 marks	1,048,000,000 marks
For the Navy.....	217,000,000 “	238,000,000 “
Together.....	958,000,000 “	1,286,000,000 “

Figured per capita of the population this was in 1902 about 7 marks and in 1911 8 1-2 marks.

Of these five nations, therefore, the United Kingdom spent most on her army and navy. Russia came next, then followed in this order, Germany, the United States and France. Reckoned, however, per capita of the population, the United Kingdom and France are far in advance of Germany, while the United States and Russia are at the bottom of the list.

But to read the true value of these statistics one should also investigate the increase of wealth per capita of the population, and then it will be seen that the 19 1-5 marks per capita paid in Germany in 1911 weighed less heavily on the people than the 15 marks in 1902, for their average wealth had grown enormously. If on the other hand the average wealth in Russia is considered, the 8 1-2 marks per capita she paid in 1911 is much greater than the 19 1-5 marks paid by Germany.

It appears, therefore, that also from the point of actual expenditure Germany cannot be called the exclusive home of militarism. This would be even clearer if the most recent figures were available, for, as was said above, France increased within the last years the length of service of her soldiers from two to three years and enlisted in her army practically every young man who was

not too obviously incapacitated. This, it has been claimed, was on her part a move to which the size of the German army had compelled her. But no flight of the imagination of even the most anti-German observer has been able to detect on the part of Germany any intention of attacking France. If France had not wished to assist Russia, or rather to fight Germany when the latter was partly engaged by Russia, there need not have been a French-German war. Germany surely did not want anything of France, while France had set her heart on Alsace-Lorraine.

The tremendous expenditures for the British army will probably be a distinct surprise to the Americans, many of whom have been thinking only of the British navy. Whether they agree with Germany or not they will appreciate the humor of the situation as it appears to the Germans, who are told that the British are fighting to put down militarism, when they are actually paying sixty per cent. per capita more for their armaments than Germany.

The humor of the situation even grows when the British attitude is taken into consideration. In a friendly discussion with an American of English descent the author was told that the success of the allies would result in universal disarmament by the establishment of an international police. When he inquired how, in view of

the general disarmament, the decrees of this court would be enforced, he was told: "Oh, well, the British navy will naturally form an important part of this police."

From these various points of view, therefore, Germany pleads "not guilty" to the charge of being the home of militarism. But if we strip militarism of its unpleasant connotations of absolutism and vicious aggressiveness, and think of it in its more literal meaning as having to do with the militia, the citizen-army of a State, then Germany is willing to acknowledge that she has endeavored to build up the best citizen-army for defence her conditions permitted. Of this she is not ashamed, nor does she fear that America, the home of men ready to die for freedom, will blame her when everything is understood.

Many British writers and speakers are quoting disconnected sentences from the book of a German fire-eater to prove that the Germans as such are like him. There are, however, similar books presenting the bellicose intentions of the British nation, notably one dedicated in 1912 to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, and so far as the writer knows, never repudiated either by him or any other British soldier or statesman. The quotations from this book, printed as Appendix B, should convince the reader that no country has a monopoly of fire-eaters, and that if militarism

is rampant in Germany because Bernhardi wished to arouse his people to a danger which he saw coming, it is thriving even more luxuriantly in England, according to Homer Lea.

Both conclusions, however, are in error, for in so far as Bernhardi preaches that "might is right" he is as little German, as Homer Lea is voicing the best British traditions when he calls on Albion to gird her loins for "it is the first duty of the British nation to arrest or destroy German power."

People removed from the seat of the conflict should not forget that one of the principles of modern warfare is to attack the enemy everywhere, and not to confine oneself to slaughtering his troops. It is considered fair to starve him, to deprive him of his credit, and to assail his reputation. The obliquity of this course appears when it is seen that often untruths are the weapons used to achieve this end. Even conscientious papers are unable to ascertain the reliability of despatches. They therefore print, and unwittingly help to disseminate erroneous information.

On the foundation blocks of such reports a structure has been reared into which the few definitely known facts seem to fit with great nicety. Germany, it has been claimed, is the home of that detestable malady called militarism.

A victory of the Allies will eradicate it from the world.

It is impossible to answer all the arguments which have been advanced by those who would make this thesis acceptable in the eyes of Americans. Americans hate the evils of militarism like no other people and have determined to stamp it out from the world. There should be no need for such huge armaments as the great powers have felt obliged to carry in recent years, and while the notion that Germany was the chief offender and had been staggering under her burden, is incorrect, her friends are the first to welcome any means that would reduce the European armaments, after this war, to more wholesome proportions.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

GERMAN statesmen have often called England a hypocrite, and themselves have been called unscrupulous believers in the pernicious doctrine that might makes right. Both estimates are unjust. An individual person may prefer to suffer rather than to do or seem to do an unjust act, but the men charged with the welfare of a nation must make this welfare the main consideration of their actions. While they will shrink from taking an actually unjust step, they may not feel justified in refraining from doing what they think is right and necessary, merely because it may *appear* to be wrong. To this extent Germans and Britons are alike. In their way of explaining their actions, however, their fundamental differences of character are seen.

The Briton feels obliged to advance some kind of a moral reason for what he does, and thereby shows that he believes morality should rule the actions of nations as well as those of

individuals. Sometimes the reason he advances seems far-fetched to those who are familiar with all the facts, but to those at a distance morality seems to have won another victory.

The German shrinks from advancing a reason which is not, in reality, the one that is controlling his action. With a regard for morality as high as that of the Briton, he refuses to make morality an excuse, and when the welfare of the nation and dire necessity have forced him to do as he did, he baldly states this fact, although his case would be stronger in the court of public opinion, if he had justified himself.

The German infringement of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium is a case in point. On August 4, the German Chancellor announced¹ to the Reichstag that by infringing the neutrality Germany had broken the law of nations, but that Germany was fighting for her existence against several foes, and in self-defence had been forced to take this step. This open confession, unembellished by any excuses, is truly German.

Sometimes a prisoner pleads guilty because he is too proud to take advantage of the safeguards offered by the law, and then the humane judge refuses to accept his plea, and assigns to the accused a lawyer. Suppose that in this case the court of public opinion should refuse to accept

¹ See Appendix A: The Chancellor's speech.

Germany's plea of guilty, and should insist upon a defence. It could be based on several, noticeably three, lines of argument.

First, Belgium had shown such hostility toward Germany and such warm friendship toward France in recent years that Germany's fear that Belgium would not remain neutral was reasonable. An advance by France through Belgium would have been fatal to Germany, for the geographical aspect of the country is such that she could not have defended herself here with only half of her army, the other half being engaged on her Eastern frontier. An initial success by the French in that part of Germany would have threatened her only big ports, Bremen and Hamburg, and her naval base at Kiel. Their destruction, however, would have been fatal. The artillery at Liège was under the instruction of French officers, and the fact that these officers were not requested to leave, but remained in the country after mobilization was ordered in Germany and France, adds to the justification of Germany's belief. The law knows no favorites. If Germany was right in believing that Belgium would not preserve her neutrality, the law which forbade her from entering Belgium would have worked an injustice. Belgium was no longer entitled to immunity from invasion. Germany is innocent; as wit-

nesses, call the files of the Belgium press of the past two years, and the French officers who remained in Liège.

The second argument would run as follows: Belgian neutrality rests on the treaty of 1839, which was signed by Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in addition to Belgium and Holland. This treaty was in the nature of a contract, and as such enjoys all the validity the law gives it. The law, however, does not recognize the validity of a contract signed under duress. Prussia and Austria were forced to sign the treaty. As witnesses, call any creditable history describing the events of 1839. As further witnesses, call the treaties made by Great Britain and Prussia, and Great Britain and France on August 9 and 11, 1870, guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium during the Franco-Prussian War. If Great Britain had considered the neutrality agreement of 1839 valid, why should she have made another agreement in 1870? Or, if she considered the earlier treaty valid, but doubted the reliability of the signatories, how could the signatures of these powers be said to be more trustworthy because they were signed to a new treaty? And why did the treaties of 1870 contain the clause that they were to terminate with the end of the war, after which the neutrality of Belgium was to rest on whatever validity there

was in the treaty of 1839? Finally, call as witness the speeches of Mr. Gladstone, who said in 1870, referring to the neutrality treaty of Belgium, "I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises." For all these reasons, the contract of 1839 is invalid, and Germany is not guilty.

The third line of argument would claim that Germany was fighting for her very existence. It is immaterial whether her own lack of precaution had brought her to the pass where she had to defend herself from three or more foes. Her life was in danger. As witnesses call the speeches of King George in proroguing Parliament, of Mr. Lloyd George, and of the openly expressed intentions of France and Russia. The law recognizes self-defence as a valid excuse. Germany, therefore, is not guilty.

Suppose, now, that the judge of public opinion, after listening to these arguments, turned to Germany and she should repeat, as she probably would, that she had felt obliged to act as she did, and would leave it to him to decide whether she

was guilty or not, would not the judge, before passing sentence, call the witnesses demanded by counsel, and if some could not be brought into court for some time, would he not adjourn the case to a later day? And in the meanwhile, is it not the rule in all civilized countries that the accused is considered innocent until he has been proved guilty? Condemnation on *ex parte* evidence is abhorrent to all justice-loving countries, and to none perhaps more than to America.

Similar arguments may be made in defence of many further accusations brought against Germany. Some, however, appear today so well substantiated that even unprejudiced people are justified in forming an opinion.

Nothing probably has struck greater horror to the hearts of peace-loving people than the dropping of bombs from Zeppelins and other airships, for the resulting loss of life seems so utterly unnecessary, and especially pitiful if it hurts non-combatants and even maims a little child. The excuse that Germany did not sign the Hague Conference, which forbade the dropping of bombs from the air, cannot justify her. The real facts in the case, however, are little known. Take for instance the Zeppelin raids on Antwerp.

Antwerp is a well-fortified city with a complicated machinery of defence, many forts, and

connections between the forts themselves and the city and the forts. There are also means of placing a great part of the country outside the city under water. The defence of a modern fortress offers many technical problems, all of which are worked out in detail beforehand. No one man — or body of men — can carry the details in his head. If the plans are destroyed, a vigorous defence of the city becomes impossible. The same, of course, will be the case if the powder magazines and the arsenals are destroyed. An attack, therefore, from the air on the military headquarters of a fortress, is like an attack on the brain of an organism. If it is successful it paralyzes the whole body. A Zeppelin raid on Antwerp which should destroy the plans of a working defence, or the supply of ammunition and provisions, would save the attacking army hundreds if not thousands of lives. From this point of view, therefore, it is not at all wanton, but actually humane.

But, it has been advanced, no bombardment should be made without previously giving notice of the intention to begin the bombardment, according to the rules of the Hague Conference. This is a mistake similar to many others made by people who believe that the Hague Conference laid down a complete set of laws. The Hague Conference contains only those stipulations on

which all the nations signing them could agree. But it requested the several nations to issue complete regulations to their troops for use in war. In these the Hague paragraphs were to be incorporated. The British had no such regulations until recently, while the French and German regulations are not at hand. It may, however, be even better to judge the conduct of the contestants, not by their individual interpretations of the Hague agreements, but by the regulations issued to the army of the United States. These have been re-printed and issued, together with the Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague, by the International School of Peace, Boston, 1908.

Paragraph 19 says: "But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy [of an intended bombardment]. Surprise may be a necessity."

Paragraph 26 says: "The people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them [commanding generals of the invading army] as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives."

Paragraph 27 in speaking of retaliations says: "A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage."

Paragraph 54 acknowledges the right to de-

mand hostages, although they "are rare in the present age."

Paragraph 82 has reference to the so-called *franc tireurs*, and says that they "shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates."

All these things are utterly abhorrent to most people, who consider them survivals of an earlier time. So they are, but they are the rules by which the awful game of war is played. Let us condemn the game, or all that take part in it, but let us not single out one of the participants, as long as he keeps within the rules, and make him the recipient of the indignation which belongs to the rules of war as such, especially not when we know the disparity in the amount of news which can reach us from the several armies.

APPENDIX A

THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG, AUGUST 4, 1914

A TERRIBLE fate is breaking over Europe. Since we won in war the respect of the world for our German Empire we have lived in peace forty-four years, and have guarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful labor we have grown strong and mighty; and people have envied us. In nervy patience we have suffered hostilities to be fanned in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged against us. The wind was sown there, and now we have the whirlwind. We wanted to go on living and working in peace, and like a silent vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit, this was the will: Our sword shall not be drawn except in a just cause. Now the day has come when we must draw it. Russia has put the torch to our house. We have been forced into a war with Russia and France.

Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the stress of hurrying events have been distributed to

you.¹ Let me single out the facts which characterize our action.

From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and labored that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All the cabinets, notably the English cabinet, took the same ground, only Russia insisted that she would have to say a word. This was the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. As soon as the first definite news of military preparations in Russia reached us, we declared in St. Petersburg, kindly but firmly, that military preparations against us would force us to take similar steps, and that mobilization and war are not far apart. Russia assured us in the most friendly way that she was taking no measures against us. England in the meanwhile was trying to mediate between Austria and Servia, and was receiving our hearty support. On July 28 the Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to consider that Austria had the right and the duty to protect herself against the Greater-Servian plots which threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to their common monarchical interest

¹ These papers the *New York Times* printed as "The German White Paper," perhaps a misnomer. While the *Times* deserves thanks for having published this information, the comparison of this hurried compilation with the well arranged British White Paper has been unfavorable to the cause of Germany.

against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the Czar to help him personally to smooth away the difficulties between Vienna and St. Petersburg. At about the same time, and before he had received this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to counsel moderation in Vienna. The Emperor accepted the part of mediator, but he has hardly begun to act, when Russia mobilizes all her troops against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary on the other hand had mobilized only her army corps on the Servian frontier, and two other corps in the north, but far removed from Russia. The Emperor at once points out to the Czar that the Russian mobilization makes his mediation, undertaken at the Czar's request, very difficult if not impossible. We nevertheless continue our mediation even to the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. During this time Russia of her own accord repeats her assurance that she is taking no military preparations against us.

Then there arrives the 31st of July. In Vienna a decision is due. We have already succeeded so far that Vienna has renewed a personal exchange of opinion with St. Petersburg, which had stopped for some time, but even before a decision is made in Vienna, we receive the news that Russia is mobilizing her entire army — that is, she is mobilizing also against us. The Rus-

sian Government, which from our repeated representations knows what a mobilization on our frontier means, does not notify us, and gives us no explanatory reply. Not until July 31st in the afternoon a telegram is received from the Czar in which he says that his army is taking no provocative attitude towards us. But — the Russian mobilization on our frontier was vigorously begun as early as during the night of July 30th. While we are still trying to mediate in Vienna at Russia's request, the whole Russian military force rises on our long, almost open frontier; and France, while she is not yet mobilizing, confesses that she is making military preparations. And we? We had intentionally refrained, up to that moment, from calling a single reservist to the colors — for the sake of the peace of Europe. Should we now be waiting any longer, until the powers between whom we are wedged in would choose their own moment of attack? To expose Germany to this danger would have been a crime! For this reason we demanded at once, on July 31st, that Russia demobilize, which action alone could still have preserved the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg was simultaneously instructed to declare that we should have to consider ourselves at war with Russia, if she declined. The Imperial Ambassador has followed his instructions.

Even today we do not yet know Russia's reply to our demand that she demobilize. No telegraphic news has reached us, although the telegraph went on for a while communicating many less important matters. So it came that when the time limit was long past the Emperor was obliged to mobilize our military forces at five o'clock in the afternoon of August 1st. At the same time we had to ask for assurances as to the attitude of France. She replied to our definite inquiry whether she would be neutral in a Russian-German war by saying that she would do what her interests demanded. This was an evasion of our question if not a negative reply. The Emperor nevertheless ordered that the French frontier be respected in its entirety. This order has been rigorously obeyed with one single exception. France, who mobilized at the same hour that we did, declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And what did really happen? Bomb throwing, flyers, cavalry scouts, and companies invading Alsace-Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war had been declared.

As regards the one exception I mentioned, I have received this report from the General Staff: "As regards the French complaints concerning our transgressing her frontier, only one

case is to be acknowledged. Contrary to definite orders a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, led it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2d. It appears that all were shot except one man, who returned. But long before this one act of crossing the frontier took place, French flyers dropped bombs as far from France as South Germany, and near the Schluchtpass French troops made an attack on our frontier guards. Thus far our troops have confined themselves to the protection of our frontier." This is the report of the General Staff.

We have been forced into a state of self-defence, and the necessity of self-defence knows no other law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already been obliged to enter Belgian territory. That is against the rules of international law. It is true that the French Government announced in Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as its opponents would do so. But we knew that France was ready for an invasion of Belgium. France could afford to wait. We could not wait. An attack on our flank on the lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. For the wrong we have done thereby we shall try to atone, as soon as our mili-

tary end is obtained. People who like ourselves are fighting for their lives and homes must think of naught but how they may survive.

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary. As regards the attitude of England, Sir Edward Grey's remarks yesterday in the lower house of Parliament have shown what her stand will be. We have assured the English Government that we shall not attack the north coast of France as long as England remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. This assurance I here repeat before the whole world; and I may add, as long as England remains neutral, we shall not even take any hostile measures against the French merchant marine, provided France will treat our merchantmen in the same way.

Gentlemen, this was the course of events. Germany enters this war with a clear conscience. We are fighting to protect the fruits of our peaceful labor, and our heritage of the great past. We are fighting for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Moltke used to say we should have to remain armed if we were to protect our heritage and our achievements of 1870.

Now the supreme hour has come which will

test our people. But it finds us ready and full of confidence. Our army is in the field, our fleet is well prepared, and back of them stands the whole German people — *The Whole German People.*

APPENDIX B¹

QUOTATIONS FROM THE BRITISH "BERNHARDI"

The Day of the Saxon by Homer Lea, Harper & Bros., London and New York, 1912. Dedicated to Field Marshal Lord Roberts. Mr. Lea was by birth an American.

It is the first duty of the British nation to arrest or destroy German power. (Page 204.)

The neutrality of a minor state, once it is included in the theater of war waged between greater nations, becomes an anomaly. (Page 213.)

Whenever it becomes apparent that one European state or racial coalition is seeking the overlordship of Europe . . . it at once becomes imperative upon the British nation to destroy this power and the means that make it possible. (Page 214.)

The occupation [of a neutral country] . . . arouses in the British nation the appearance of great opposition to the violation of neutral territory. This is false, for the Empire is not moved by the sanctity of neutrality. It is only a means of avoiding responsibility and shifting

¹See also Chapters I and IX.

it upon these nations, deluding themselves with the belief that such declarations are inviolable; whereas no nation has violated neutral territory and denied their obligations more frequently than the Saxon. (Page 226.)

National disintegration originates in peace. (Page 233.)

If the Saxon race is to survive it can do so only as a whole (1) through the military and naval unification of the Empire; (2) the complete separation of the military and naval system from the civil government of the dominions and colonies; (3) the introduction of universal and compulsory military service among the Saxons throughout the Empire; (4) all armies to be organized on the basis of expeditionary forces; (5) the size and distribution of the Imperial armies to be determined by the size and distribution of its probable adversaries; (6) the militancy of the Saxon race, and the actual military power of the Empire increased with every military increment made by nations whose natural lines of expansion are toward territories and peoples now under British dominion; (7) the military and political unity of the Empire must progress toward greater centralization as the population of its component parts is increased. (Pages 239, 240.)

A confederacy is an old ignorance. It is a

falsification of political independence, and has no more a place in a modern state than have those other blind errors nations have put away forever. (Page 241.)

The brutality of all national development is apparent, and we make no excuse for it. To conceal it would be a denial of fact; to glamour it over, an apology to truth. There is little in life that is not brutal except our ideal. As we increase the aggregate of individuals and their collective activities, we increase proportionately their brutality. (Page 10.)

Only the immediate causes and manner of war, those last straws that break down the peace of nations, alter from age to age. In the past it was the individual who was the predominant factor, today, nations, tomorrow, races. (Page 15.)

There can be no further extension of British Sovereignty without encroachment upon the political rights and territorial possessions of other nations. (Page 23.)

It is very simple, this irrevocable law of war. It is terrible in its simplicity. (Page 23.)

For a Saxon to deny war is to epitomize human vanity. (Page 22.)

In the development of the Russian Empire man has more nearly approached those characteristics that mark the measured, unhurried growth

of Nature. In its extension it has moved onward with elemental propulsion. Like a glacier, its movement is only apparent by periods of time. So imperceptible is the terrible, imperturbable grind of its way that we do not perceive its progress until it has passed a given point. What it does not crush it erodes. What it does not erode it forces on in front until into some crevasse, great or small, it pushes the debris that impedes its way. It moves on. (Page 106.)

There is a savage sublimity in this thought — to use empires as stepping stones. (Page 146.)

Wars have brought about the formation of this Empire and wars will prolong or shorten its existence. (Page 3.)

By wars and conquests, by theft and intrigue, by the same brutal use of physical power, was it [the British Empire] put together piece by piece. (Page 10.)

The scorn of war, like the denial of death, belongs to the same category of self-deception. (Page 6.)

THE END

135678.

HG

M149W

Author Mach, Edmund von.

Title What Germany wants.

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

Do not
remove
the card
from this
Pocket.

Acme Library Card Pocket
Under Pat. "Ref. Index File."
Made by LIBRARY BUREAU

